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This Note examines the types of protection given to databases in both the United States and
Europe. Part I discusses the reasons for providing databases protection. Part I also provides
background information on the EU Database Directive, and examines the history of copyright pro-
tection of databases in the United States in light of a landmark Supreme Court decision and then
analyzes the approach to database protection arising under the Collections of Information An-
tipiracy Act, a proposed law in the U.S. Congress. Part II balances sui generis protection in the EU
Database Directive with misappropriation in H.R. 354. Part II also discusses the issues involved in
providing reciprocal protection, and examines H.R. 354 as a response to the EU Database Direc-
tive. Part II then provides a comparison of U.S. and E.U. database protections through an analysis
of the UK Regulations implementing the Database Directive. Part III argues that H.R. 354 was
sufficient to satisfy the comparable protection standard in the EU Database Directive. Part III fur-
ther asserts that in light of H.R. 354’s failure to pass through Congress, U.S. lawmakers should
pass a statute that meets the comparable protection standard and suggests issues for lawmakers to
address in a new database protection bill.
NOTE
LEGISLATING THE GOLDEN RULE:
ACHIEVING COMPARABLE PROTECTION




The American soldiers serving in Operation Desert Storm
sat in their tents in Kuwait, anticipating an attack by thousands
of heavily armed Iraqi soldiers.' The soldiers had not antici-
pated sand vipers2 seeking shelter indoors, inside the soldiers'
tents.' Fortunately for the soldiers, U.S. expeditionary forces
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1. See Reuters, War in the Guf: Pentagon Statement: Cheney's Remarks After Start of
Ground War, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1991, at A19 (defining Operation Desert Storm as
large scale American ground operation against Iraqi military forces inside Kuwait). Op-
eration Desert Storm was part of a combined air, land, and sea campaign that was care-
fully planned to force Iraq out of Kuwait with the fewest possible casualties to American
allied forces. Id.; War in the Gulf The General; 'A Fire of Determination', N.Y. TiMEs, Jan.
17, 1991, at A17 (describing mission of Operation Desert Storm). Desert Storm was an
offensive campaign intended to enforce the United Nations resolutions that Iraq must
cease its abuse of Kuwait and withdraw its forces from Kuwait. Id.; Andrew Rosenthal,
War in the Gulf: The Overview- U.S. and Allies Open Air War on Iraq; Bomb Baghdad and
Kuwaiti Targets; 'No Choice' But Force, Bush Declares; No Ground Fighting Yet; Call to Arms by
Hussein, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 17, 1991, at Al (relaying statement of President Bush). Presi-
dent Bush explained that after months of continuous diplomatic efforts to negotiate
with Iraq, the only viable option available to the United States and its allies was military
action against Iraq. Id.
2. See Lisa Van Proyen & Phillip W. Brown, Woman Killed by Viper Bite Was Afraid Pets
Would Be Seized: Aspiring Zoo Keeper Had 10 Deadly and Illegal Snakes in Mobile Home, DAL,
tAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 19, 1999, at 10A (noting that sand vipers are poisonous snakes
whose venomous bites may cause convulsions and death); see also Chris Hedges, GI. 's in
the Gulf Meet the Enemy: Sand Flies, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 28, 1994, at A4 (specifying that
troops encountered poisonous sand vipers during Operation Desert Storm); 'Mail is
Best Thing' About Serving in Desert, ST. Louis Pos-r-DIsPATcH, INC., Feb. 21, 1991, at 1E
(providing account of soldiers in Desert Storm who were afraid of sand vipers while
fighting in Persian Gulf).
3. See Bill Menezes, Firm Offers Antidote for Emergencies: Micromedex Computerized Sys-
tem Identifies Treatments for Poison to Gunshots, DENY. Roc"y MTN. NEWS, Feb. 7, 1996, at
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had Poisindex.4 Poisindex is a system designed to allow medical
personnel to quickly identify their patient's problem and appro-
priate treatment. 5 Armed with Poisindex's portable system, field
hospitals in Desert Storm were able to treat viper bites sustained
by military medical personnel.6
Now suppose that the data listed in Poisindex was copied
and posted on the Internet.7 Commentators opine that there
would be no legal liability if the pirated version of Poisindex,
38A (explaining that military medical personnel had no practical experience with
snakes and other dangerous animals living in desert). A portable database assisted
medical personnel with treating snake bites in Operation Desert Storm. Id.; John
Daniszewski, Saudis Push Preservation of Wildlife; Ecology: Urbanized Kingdom Has Protected
11 Habitats Since 1986, Plans 100 More. Effort Seeks to Restore Ties to the Land, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1997, at A6 (discussing that sand vipers are dangerous snakes who live in desert
in Saudi Arabia); Bill Dietrich, Allies Step Up Pace of Air War-Citizen Soldiers: Duty Calls-
War Shatters Their Civilian Lives, SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 3, 1991, at Al (noting soldiers in
Operation Desert Storm lived in areas infested with sand vipers).
4. See Menezes, supra note 3, at 10A (describing Poisindex as poison identifying
system originally available only on Microfiche but now portable). Poisindex is a
database that links drug or poison descriptions to treatment. Id. Poisindex is manufac-
tured by Micromedex Inc., a producer of interactive information systems. Id.
5. See id. (noting that before Poisindex, reference materials related to poison treat-
ments were extremely limited). The previous materials were available only as hard-copy
publications that were not frequently updated. Id.; Joann Scelsa, Ready for Anything:
Niagara County Builds on Head Start Thwarting Terrorism, BuF. NEWS, Oct. 14, 2001, at
NC1 (reporting that Poisindex can identify ingredients in hundreds of thousands of
commercial, pharmaceutical, and biological substances and their symptoms, effects,
and treatment); Jill M. Singer, For Poison Victims, Help Is Close at Hand, WASH. POST, Nov.
6, 1980, at DC7 (emphasizing that Poisindex enables national poison center to tell phy-
sicians what antidotes to administer); see generally Beverly Beyette, A Statewide Hot Line
Answers the Call on Toxic Hazards, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1986, at VI (discussing incident
where poison control center used Poisindex to reassure caller that particular lizard bite
was not toxic).
6. See Menezes, supra note 3, at 38A (explaining that Poisindex helped soldiers in
Desert Storm identify and treat patients' medical problems).
7. See Anne E. Kornblut, Database Compilers Fight for Copyright Protection, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 21, 1999, at Al (explaining that while Poisindex has not been copied, it is
often cited as example of database that if copied, would have tangible consequences);
see also Bob Dart, Researchers Wary of Extending Electronic Database Protection, Cox NEWS
SERV., Oct. 23, 1997 (commenting that Internet accelerates information age and makes
compilations of data like Poisindex even more valuable and vulnerable to piracy);
Michael Freno, Database Protection: Resolving the U.S. Database Dilemma with an Eye Toward
International Protection, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 165, 167 (2001) (positing that putting
Micromedex's Poisindex on Internet may stop Micromedex from further investment in
databases and cause slippery slope of private investors avoiding investments in database
development); David Mirchin, Putting an End to Database Piracy, BOSTON GLOBE, June 2,
1998, at C4 (reporting that competitors can copy Poisindex and sell it without legal
consequences). The lack of database protection leaves publishers with no incentive to
update their research. Id.
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published without updates, revisions, or accurate instructions,
provided outdated medical advice.' In this type of situation, ex-
perts discuss that there would be no incentive for Poisindex's
creators to improve upon the original database.' Experts further
note that databases are expensive to create and condoning
database piracy results in minimal incentive for corporations to
invest in their creation. ° Advances in technology make database
8. See Freno, supra note 7, at 167 (explaining that there is little database producers
can do to stop unauthorized copying of databases onto Internet). This reduces the
incentive for business to invest in database production. Id.; Kornblut, supra note 7, at
Al (noting that placing unauthorized copies of databases on Internet removes all types
of legal recourse for incorrect information).
9. See Kornblut, supra note 7, at Al (stating that putting unauthorized copies of
databases on Internet reduces incentive for database creators to invest in database im-
provements); see also CRAIGJOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 268-69 (5th ed. 2001) (explain-
ing that term "database" encompasses many kinds of collections of information); see also
Barry R. Furrow, Broadcasting Clinical Guidelines on the Internet: Will Physicians Tune In?,
25 AM. J.L. & MED. 403, 420 (presenting examples of databases). One example is MD-
Consult, a user-friendly commercial database that can only be accessed by subscription.
Id. MDConsult houses hundreds of medical textbooks and treatises and provides easy
access to clinical practice guidelines. Id.; Brian L. Betker et al., Warm with Sunny Skies:
Disclosure Statement Forecasts, 73 AM. BANKR. LJ. 809, 816 n.37 (1999) (discussing Compu-
stat as example of historical database produced and sold by Standard and Poor's).
Compustat consists of financial, statistical, and market information that covers both
industrial and non-industrial public corporations. Id. The Compustat database is one
of the most commonly used databases in financial economics. Id. The Compustat
database is widely recognized and acclaimed for its correctness. Id.; Dennis Cline, Com-
ment, Copyright Protection of Software in the EEC: The Competing Policies Underlying Commu-
nity and National Law and the Case for Harmonization, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 633, 664 n. 150
(1987) (noting other examples of licensed access databases to include Lexis and
Westlaw, multiple listing services for real estate and library search systems); George A.
Cooke, Jr. et al., Before UCITA: Licensing, Selling, & Using Information Under the Proposal
Formerly Known as U. C. C. Article 2B and Federal Database Protection Legislastion, 18 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 615, 621 (2000) (positing institutions that have valuable data and that
collect data regularly as American Medical Association and NASDAQ).
10. See Joseph A. Saltiel, Note, With Nowhere Else to Hide Can the First Amendment
Protect Databases?, 2001 J.L. TECH & POL'Y 163, 163 (equating information with eco-
nomic power). Data is so valuable that many business make significant investments to
build and maintain databases. Id. The value of a database can be diminished when
competitors are able to access unauthorized copies of a database. Id. Without the abil-
ity to restrict access to a database, businesses are discouraged from investing in
databases. Id.; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and Contract Law for the Information
Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Information and
Commerce, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1999) (explaining that by denying database makers
legal protection, there will be fewer quality databases available to users); see also World
Intellectual Property Organization, Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases to be Considered by the Diplo-
matic Conference, CRNR/DC/6, 6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (addressing expense involved in
database creation). The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Database
Treaty's preamble asserts that the contracting parties:
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piracy much simpler by facilitating both reproduction and unau-
thorized access to the contents of the database itself.11
Recently, the European Union ("EU") attempted to allevi-
ate this problem by implementing a "golden rule" for database
protection. 12 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of March 11, 1996 on the Legal Protection of
Databases ("Database Directive" or "Directive") 13 requires non-
Member States to provide "comparable protection" for databases
in order to receive protection for databases in the EU.' 4 Under
Recognizing that databases are a vital element in the development of a global
information infrastructure and an essential tool for promoting economic, cul-
tural and technological advancement, [r]ecognizing that the making of
databases requires the investment of considerable human, technical and finan-
cial resources but that such databases can be copied or accessed at a fraction
of the cost needed to design them independently, [and] [d]esiring to estab-
lish a new form of protection for databases by granting rights adequate to
enable the makers of databases to recover the investment they have made in
their databases and by providing international protection in a manner as effec-
tive and uniform as possible.
Id.
11. See Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Congress, First Session, 145 CONG.
REC. S316 (Jan. 19, 1999) (statement of Senator Hatch) (arguing for database protec-
tion bill in United States). Senator Hatch stated:
American database providers render an invaluable service by collecting, or-
ganizing, and disseminating billions of bits of information from myriad
sources of every possible sector of our economy .... To a large extent, tech-
nology has been the fire that has fueled the growth of the database indus-
try .... But while technological measures for protecting databases are still
emerging, current technology has greatly contributed to the uncertainty that
surrounds existing database protections.
Id.; see also Collections of Information Antipiracy Act: Hearings on H.R. 354 Before the
House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, 106th Cong. 2 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Antipiracy Hearings] (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
12. See Todd Waller, M.D., Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling
Center: Application of Traditional Tort Law Post-Tarasoff, 31 AKRON L. REv. 321, 323
(1997) (defining golden rule as "do unto others what you would have them do unto
you"); Dart, supra note 7 (commenting that unless United States implements similar
rule, U.S. database operators will be at competitive disadvantage).
13. Council Directive No. 96/9, O.J. L 77/20 (1996) [hereinafter Database Direc-
tive]. (explaining that on March 11, 1996, European Union ("EU") addressed its need
for greater database protection). The European Union ("EU") passed Directive 96/9
Concerning the Legal Protection of Databases, to provide form of protection resem-
bling copyright for databases. Id.
14. See id. art. 11, recital 56 (explaining comparable protection). Recital 56 states:
Whereas the right to prevent unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization in
respect of a database should apply to databases whose makers are nationals or
habitual residents of third countries or to those produced by legal persons not
established in a Member State, within the meaning of the Treaty, only if such
third countries offer comparable protection to the databases produced by nation-
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the Database Directive, the EU provides foreign database makers
with comparable protection to that afforded to EU produced
databases by foreign nations. 15
This Note examines the types of protection given to
databases in both the United States and Europe. Part I discusses
the reasons for providing databases protection. Part I also pro-
vides background information on the EU Database Directive,
and examines the history of copyright protection of databases in
the United States in light of a landmark Supreme Court deci-
sion 6 and then analyzes the approach to database protection
arising under the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act
("H.R. 354" or "Act"), a proposed law in the U.S. Congress.17
als of a Member State or persons who have their habitual residence in the
territory of the Community.
Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id.
16. See Feist Publ'n v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350-51 (holding facts
are not copyrightable). Only the selection and arrangement of facts are copyrightable.
Id.; see also Jennett M. Hill, Note, The State of Copyright Protection for Electronic Databases
Beyond ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Are Shrinkwrap Licenses a Viable Alternative for Database Pro-
tection?, 31 IND. L. REV. 143, 147 (1998) (commenting on Supreme Court unwillingness
in Feist to extend copyright protection to protect author's investment in database). Feist
diminished copyright protection for databases. Id.; Philip H. Miller, Note, Life After
Feist: Facts, the First Amendment, and the Copyright Status of Automated Databases, 60 FORD-
HAM L. Rav. 507, 508 (1991) (articulating test established by Supreme Court in Feist).
The test of whether a database qualifies for copyright protection is if the author or
creator has displayed sufficient originality in selecting and arranging the facts that
make up the compilation. Id.
17. See Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999)
[hereinafter H.R. 354 or the Act];J. Ryan Mitchell, If at Feist You Don't Succeed, Try, Try
Again: An Evaluation of the Proposed Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, 78 NEB. L.
REv. 900, 910 (1999) (noting that unlike previous database protection bill, H.R. 2652
did not provide sui generis protection to databases but aimed to protect databases
against harmful misappropriations). This bill was approved by the House Judiciary
Committee on March 24, 1998, and while the House supported it, the Senate did not
receive it as favorably. Id. A compromise solution was not reached before the end of
the 105th session. Id.; see also Lisa Barr, Legislative Update: Database Protection Bill, 8. J.
ART & ENT. LAw 371, 377-79 (1998) (explaining that H.R. 354 was not first attempt by
United States to give greater protection to databases). In 1996, Representative Carlos
Moorhead of California introduced the Database Investment and Intellectual Property
Act of 1996 or House Resolution 3531 ("1996 Act"). Id. The professed goal of the 1996
Act was to prevent actual or threatened competitive injury by misappropriating a
database or its contents without targeting non-competitive uses. Id. The bill was highly
criticized on the grounds that it contained inadequate fair use provisions, and also be-
cause the drafters of the bill did not consult with the relevant scientific and educational
communities. Id. H.R. 3531 failed because of these criticisms. Id. On October 9, 1997,
Representative Howard Coble of North Carolina introduced House Bill 2652, the Col-
lections of Information Antipiracy Act. Id.
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Part II balances sui generis 8 protection in the EU Database Direc-
tive with misappropriation19 in H.R. 354. Part II also discusses
18. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 7(1) (describing sui generis protec-
tion). Article 7 states:
Object of protection
1. Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a database which
shows that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial
investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the con-
tents to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a sub-
stantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents
of that database.
2. For the purposes of this Chapter:
(a) 'extraction' shall mean the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a
substantial part of the contents of a database to another medium by
any means or in any form;
(b) 're-utilization' shall mean any form making available to the public all
or a substantial part of the contents of a database by the distribution of
copies, by renting, by on-line or other forms of transmission. The first
sale of a copy of a database within the Community by the rightholder
or with his consent shall exhaust the right to control resale of the copy
within the Community;
Public lending is not an act of extraction or re-utilization.
3. The right referred to in paragraph 1 may be transferred, assigned or granted
under contractual licence.
4. The right provided for in paragraph 1 shall apply irrespective of the eligibility of
that database for protection by copyright or by other rights. Moreover, it shall
apply irrespective of eligibility of the contents of that database for protection by
copyright or by other rights. Protection of databases under the right provided
for in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to rights existing in respect of
their contents.
5. The repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-utilization of insubstantial
parts of the contents of the database implying acts which conflict with a normal
exploitation of that database or which unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the maker of the database shall not be permitted.
Id.; see also Freno, supra note 7, at 182-83 (explaining scope of sui generis right as protec-
tion which applies to collection of independent works or data, which database maker
qualitatively or quantitatively made substantial investment in acquiring, substantiating,
or presenting contents); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protec-
tion of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 151, 171 (1997) (not-
ing that sui generis right encompasses substantial investment made by database produc-
ers).
19. See Katherine F. Horvath, Case Comment, NBA v. Motorola: A Case For Federal
Preemption of Misappropriation?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 461, 479 (1998) (defining misap-
propriation as unfair appropriation of factual information); James E. Hudson, III, A
Survey of the Texas Unfair-Competition Tort of Common Law Misappropriation, 50 BAYLOR L.
REv. 921, 923 (1998) (describing misappropriation as appropriation and use by defen-
dant who is in competition with plaintiff). A misappropriation must utilize a unique
pecuniary interest created by the plaintiff through labor, skill, and money. Id. Misap-
propriation is a common law tort and can safeguard intellectual property that is not
otherwise protected by federal copyright laws. Id.; see also David Djavaherian, Com-
ment, Hot News and No Cold Facts: NBA v. Motorola and the Protection of Database Contents,
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the issues involved in providing reciprocal protection, and exam-
ines H.R. 354 as a response to the EU Database Directive. Part II
then provides a comparison of U.S. and EU database protections
through an analysis of the UK Regulations implementing the
Database Directive. Part III argues that H.R. 354 was sufficient
to satisfy the comparable protection standard in the EU
Database Directive. Part III further asserts that in light of H.R.
354's failure to pass through Congress, U.S. lawmakers should
pass a statute that meets the comparable protection standard
and suggests issues for lawmakers to address in a new database
protection bill.
I. PLAYING FAIR: DATABASE PROTECTION STANDARDS IN
THE EU AND THE UNITED STATES
Commentators maintain that databases require protection
from misappropriations of their author's work.2 0  The EU re-
quires comparable database protection from non-Member States
in order to receive protection under its Database Directive.
21
U.S. Act H.R. 354 attempted to provide reciprocal protection for
5 RiCH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 6 (1998), at http://www.richmond.edu/-jolt/v5i2/djava.html
(noting misappropriation is part of broader tort of unfair competition).
20. See Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Database Protection: Is It Broken
and Should We Fix It?, SCIENCE, May 14, 1999, at 1129 (articulating most common argu-
ment for statutory protection of databases). Databases are expensive to create but inex-
pensive to copy. Id. As a result of this inequity, private and commercial database own-
ers cannot compete with database copiers in an open market. Id. Unless databases can
earn a fair return on their investment, businesses will be unlikely to invest in databases.
Id.; see also IIA Praises Introduction of Database Protection Measure; House Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property Introduces Database Investment and Intellectual Property An-
tipiracy Act of 1996, Information Industry Association, INFO. TODAY, July 1996, at 12 [herein-
after IlA Praises Introduction] (remarking that databases need protection to combat un-
fair competition). Protecting databases encourages the development of more innova-
tive and useful databases. Id.; Lawrence Guthrie, II, Legal Protection for Databases: A
Summary, INFO. OUTLOOK, Nov., 1997, at 40 (arguing that databases are important to
U.S. economy); Tim Studt, Why You Need Database Protection, R & D, Sept., 1997, at Si
(commenting that database protection legislation is necessary to preserve and en-
courage continued creation of databases).
21. See Thomas Hoeren, EU Leads World Towards Database Protection, INTELL. PROP.
WORLDWIDE, July, 1997 (explaining that Database Directive grants protection to non-
Member States only on reciprocal basis). Due to the fact that the United States does
not provide comparable protection to EU companies, U.S. companies cannot receive
reciprocal protection in the EU. Id.; see also IIA Praises Introduction, supra note 20, at 12
(asserting that unless United States adopts database protection measure that provides
comparable protection, U.S. database producers will be at disadvantage in international
database market).
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U.S. databases in Europe under the Database Directive.22
A. Protecting Databases
Commentators opine that databases require protection
from destructive appropriations within the market. 23 As a result,
database providers that make the contents of their database pub-
licly available risk misappropriations of their work.24 Accord-
ingly, this availability reduces the incentive for providers to con-
tinue maintaining and providing their existing databases and
similarly limits motivation regarding investing in and creating
new ones.25 Modern technology increases this risk, because it is
now possible for people to copy substantial amounts of material
22. See Doug Isenberg, The Database Debate; Will States Regulate Where the Feds Have
Feared to Tread?, INTERNET WORLD, Apr. 15, 2001, Policy Watch (noting that bills includ-
ing H.R. 354 were introduced in U.S. Congress to provide legal safeguards comparable
to those in Database Directive); Louis Jacobson, Dueling Over Data, NAT'L J., Jan. 10,
1998 (asserting that H.R. 354 would trigger reciprocal protection under Database Di-
rective).
23. See Eric A. Prager, Protecting Data and Databases, 644 PRAc. L. INST. PAT., Copy-
RIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 597, 599 (2001)
(detailing historic importance of databases to economy and discussing incentive/dis-
semination theory). The theory of incentive/dissemination suggests that protection
was appropriate under the "sweat of the brow" doctrine. Id.; Mitchell, supra note 17, at
915 (1999) (evaluating level of protection databases have received in recent years).
The "sweat of the brow" doctrine is a theory used to justify the protection of factual
compilations. Id. See also Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991)
(holding underlying notion behind "sweat of the brow" doctrine to be that copyright is
reward for hard work that goes into compiling facts); but see A Burning Issue For Online
Copiers: Intellectual Property: Copyright is Going Digital. But in Rush to Keep Up with Technol-
ogy, New Laws Threaten to Squeeze Consumer Rights, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 31, 2002,
(Inside Track), at 16 (alleging that giving people property rights in facts poses serious
problems). Allowing property rights in facts shifts the balance of power from the con-
sumer to the content owner. Id. This limits database users' rights to exercise fair deal-
ing rights, which allow consumers to use portions of copyrighted text without the per-
mission of the copyright owner. Id.
24. See Prager, supra note 23, at 599 (noting that federal copyright law alone pro-
vides insufficient protection from harmful competitive misappropriation); John F. Hay-
den, Recent Development: Copyright Protection of Computer Databases After Feist, 5 HARv. J.
LAW & TECH. 215, 240 (1991) (arguing that federal copyright law fails to protect
databases from being copied by competitors without risk of liability).
25. See Prager, supra note 23, at 599 (examining influence of Internet on collec-
tion and reproduction of data and databases); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Ex-
cuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 1, 9, 23-24 (2000) (suggesting threat of
having unauthorized copies of database put on Internet decreases incentive for
database producers to make new databases). Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where
Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1645, 1685 (1996)
(addressing copyright law from economic standpoint). Copyright law is a means of
promoting an efficient allocation of resources to enhance the advancement of learning
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using only their home computers.26
Proponents of increased legal protection for databases ar-
gue that there are at least three assumptions that encourage soci-
ety to protect databases.27 First, databases are socially useful and
therefore, society should support their production.28 Second,
investment and development of databases can be advanced
through legal protection.29 Third, legal protection should not
allow a monopoly in database contents because information
should be built upon in the public domain rather than impeding
as a public good. Id. Without economic incentive, database makers are left with little
incentive to create databases that add to the public good. Id.
26. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 915 (noting simplicity of clicking computer
mouse and thereby pirating database); Hayden, supra note 1, at 216 (addressing how
database development requires considerable effort and cost while database copying is
simple and inexpensive). Effective development of a database involves participation by
a variety of experts. Id. First, marketing experts have to identify a market niche and
potential customers. Id. These experts must assess user characteristics and locate and
analyze potential sources of information. Id. The developer then carefully picks data
from accessible sources and compiles his findings into a reasoned whole. Id. When a
comprehensive set of data is finally put together, other experts must turn it into a com-
puter friendly format. Id. In addition to the costs of collecting and organizing data,
database developers may incur additional costs in obtaining access to proprietary data
sources. Id. Despite the level of resources required to create a database, a database can
be copied quickly with little effort. Id.
27. See Paula Baron, Back to the Future: Learning from the Past in the Database Debate,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 879, 885 (2001) (describing three arguments for protecting databases);
Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common
with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation,
42 B.C. L. REv. 1, 2 n.1 (2000) (articulating argument for protecting databases). The
copyright system encourages the development of information and its dissemination by
providing financial incentives for compilation. Id.; Christian H. Nadan, Comment, A
Proposal to Recognize Component Works: How a Teddy Bears on the Competing Ends of Copyright
Law, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1633, 1635-36 (1990) (specifying goals of copyright protection
for databases). Copyright protection aims to protect authors and therefore give them
an incentive to create new works. Id. Copyright law also strives to promote public ac-
cess to information and knowledge. Id. This dichotomy is handled by a limited period
of copyright protection and in the decision of what is copyrightable. Id.
28. See Baron, supra note 27, at 884 (noting that numerous commentators recog-
nize importance of databases to our economic, cultural, scientific, and technical pro-
gress); see also Hayden, supra note 1, at 215 (asserting that sophistication of computer
databases makes them invaluable tools in today's economy). Financial information
databases provide investors, regulators, and participants in all financial markets with
new tools for analysis. Id. at 243 n.4. Large database systems are the basis for hundreds
of thousands of daily business decisions while demographic databases influence the de-
cisions of companies involved in marketing, fundraising, and planning decisions. Id.
Students and researchers rely on bibliographic databases. Id. Industrial databases pro-
vide a springboard for important decisions made by corporations and governments. Id.
29. See Prager, supra note 23, at 601-04 (discussing value of data and databases in
relation to current protections in United States and EU).
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the free flow of information.3 °
B. Protection of Databases in the EU
On March 11, 1996, the EU passed the Database Directive. 1
Generally, EU directives seek to unify national laws of Member
States in order to ensure the free movement of goods. 2 The EU
obtains uniformity by requiring national laws to comlply with Di-
rectives. 33 The Recitals of the Directive ("Recitals") 34 offer sev-
eral justifications for harmonizing EU database laws.35 The
Council found Member State legislation protecting databases in-
sufficient and inconsistent.36 Experts note that these differences
30. See Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1995) (maintaining that fundamental goal of copyright law is to
benefit public by encouraging creation and distribution of new copyrighted works). In
order to accomplish this, the newly created works must be accessible to the public. Id.
31. See Database Directive, supra note 13; see also Freno, supra note 7, at 225 n.120
(describing motives behind Collections of Information Antipiracy Act ("Database Direc-
tive" or "Directive") and discussing its goal to provide copyright-like protection to
databases).
32. See Treaty establishing the European Community, O.J. C 340/3 (1997) [herein-
after EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam amending the
Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and
certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1, art. 249 (ex. art. 189) (defining effect of
directive as "binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which
it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and meth-
ods"); see also GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY LAw 75 (1993) (describing directive as instrument which calls upon Member States
to take legislative and/or administrative action needed to implement directive's pur-
poses); Mark Schneider, The European Union Database Directive, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
551, 552 (1998) (explaining that Database Directive was passed to provide uniform pro-
tection for databases in all EU Member States);Jeffrey B. Ritter et al., Emerging Trends in
International Privacy Law, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 87, 94-95 (2001) (focusing on how
directives pursue harmonization among Member States by defining minimum stan-
dards to guide Member States in enacting enabling legislation); Emma Tucker, Protec-
tion Plan For Databases, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 27, 1996, at 2 (indicating that
Database Directive is geared to harmonize widely different legal systems throughout
Europe).
33. See, e.g., BERMANN ET. AL., supra note 32, at 74-75 (explaining that Member
States harmonize national laws to comply with directives because directives are "bind-
ing" even though they may not be "directly applicable").
34. See Paul Durdik, Ancient Debate, New Technology: The European Community Moves
to Protect Computer Databases, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 153, 153 (1994) (describing Recitals of
Directive ("Recitals") as instrument within Directive to indicate policy behind imple-
menting directive).
35. See Database Directive, supra note 13, recitals; Schneider, supra note 32, at 551
n.13 (defining Recitals as official comments accompanying Directive and explaining
that Recitals are often useful for determining legislative intent).
36. See Database Directive, supra note 13, recital 1 (discussing reasons for harmo-
2002] LEGISLATING THE GOLDEN RULE
frustrated the functioning of the internal European market by
hindering efforts to provide on-line database goods and services
throughout the EU.3 7 The Recitals also articulate that these in-
consistencies could become more pronounced through the in-
dependent legislative acts of Member States.38 The Directive
views unharmonized intellectual property rights with respect to
differences in scope and conditions of protection as a barrier to
the free movement of goods and services within the commu-
nity.3 9
nizing EU database laws). Recital 1 asserts that "[w]hereas databases are at present not
sufficiently protected in all Member States by existing legislation; whereas such protec-
tion, where it exists, has different attributes." Id.; see also Matthew Wayman, Interna-
tional Database Protection: A Multilateral Treaty Solution to the United States Dilemma, 37
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 427, 439-40 (1997) (giving example of United Kingdom's protec-
tion of raw data and United Kingdom's tendency to grant fifty-year copyright protection
for works such as printed directories or database printouts while most other countries
in Europe offered no comparable protection); John Adams, "Small Earthquake in Vene-
zuela" The Database Regulations 1997, [1997] EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 129, 129 (noting
that Database Directive was designed to address differing originality requirements
among EU Member States). Even where Member State legislation existed to protect
databases, it was extremely dissimilar. Id. For example, the United Kingdom and Ire-
land had very weak originality requirements while the rest of Europe had stronger au-
thor's rights protections. Id.
37. See Adams, supra note 36, at 129 (explaining that EU tried to correct these
disparities by raising copyright threshold to equal protection in both United Kingdom
and Ireland); Schneider, supra note 32, at 552-53 (commenting that EU accomplished
uniform database protection by requiring Member States to enact national laws imple-
menting Database Directive). This eliminated inequalities for database protection
among Member States. Id.
38. See Database Directive, supra note 13, recital 2 (expressing concern for varying
Member State laws regarding databases). Recital 2 states:
Whereas such differences in the legal protection of databases offered by the
legislation of the Member States have direct negative effects on the function-
ing of the internal market as regards databases and in particular on the free-
dom of natural and legal persons to provide on-line database goods and ser-
vices on the basis of harmonized legal arrangements throughout the Commu-
nity; whereas such differences could well become more pronounced as
Member States introduce new legislation in this field, which is now taking on
an increasingly international dimension.
Id.
39. See Database Directive, supra note 13, recital 3 (noting that differences within
internal market hindered EU from being free from trade barriers). Recital 3 states:
Whereas existing differences distorting the functioning of the internal market
need to be removed and new ones prevented from arising, while differences
not adversely affecting the functioning of the internal market or the develop-
ment of an information market within the Community need not be removed
or prevented from arising.
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The European Commission ("Commission") also drafted
the Directive with an eye towards greater protection for the capi-
tal investment required for database production and towards
continued profit incentive for the database producers.4 ° The
Commission's design reflects a desire to encourage investment
in database compilation.4' The European Council of Ministers
("Council") also recognized that databases are an increasingly
valuable and profitable product as a result of advances in digital
technology.4 2 Advances in computer technology, however, make
40. See Adams, supra note 36, at 129 (discussing Database Directive in context of
European Common Market); G.M. Hunsucker, The European Database Directive: Regional
Stepping Stone to an International Model?, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 697,
726-27 (1997) (asserting Database Directive protects investment of labor and capital
made by diligent database compilers); Schneider, supra note 32, at 552 (suggesting
Commission passed Database Directive to give greater protection to database investors).
This leaves a profit incentive for database investors to continue to produce databases.
Id.
41. See Alan Cane, One Step Forward and Two Back, FIN. TIMES (London), June 16,
1992, at 17 (asserting rationale behind Database Directive is that without protection for
databases, producers would refrain from investing in these databases); see also Durdik,
supra note 34, at 153 (arguing that Commission proceedings indicate EU's need to
improve its global position in information industry); Tucker, supra note 32, at 2 (re-
marking that Database Directive is geared towards ensuring attractive environment for
investment in databases).
42. See Database Directive, supra note 13, recitals 7-12, 38-40 (asserting value of
databases). The Directive states:
(7) Whereas the making of databases requires the investment of considera-
ble human, technical and financial resources while such databases can
be copied or accessed at a fraction of the cost needed to design them
independently;
(8) Whereas the unauthorized extraction and/or reutilization of the con-
tents of a database constitute acts which can have serious economic and
technical consequences;
(9) Whereas databases are a vital tool in the development of an information
market within the Community; whereas this tool will also be of use in
many other fields;
(10) Whereas the exponential growth, in the Community and worldwide, in
the amount of information generated and processed annually in all sec-
tors of commerce and industry calls for investment in all the Member
States in advanced information processing systems;
(11) Whereas there is at present a very great imbalance in the level of invest-
ment in the database sector both as between the Member States and be-
tween the Community and the world's largest database-producing third
countries;
(12) Whereas such an investment in modern information storage and
processing systems will not take place within the Community unless a
stable and uniform legal protection regime is introduced for the protec-
tion of the rights of makers of databases;
(38) Whereas the increasing use of digital recording technology exposes the
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electronically-stored data collections increasingly susceptible to
piracy.43 Commentators discuss that the Database Directive grew
out of the demand for a form of protection that would counter-
act the effects of increases in piracy and provide an incentive for
investing in the creation of databases.44
The Directive defines a database as set of works, data, or
other stand-alone materials arranged in an ordered way.45 The
database maker to the risk that the contents of his database may be cop-
ied and rearranged electronically, without his authorization, to produce
a database of identical content which, however, does not infringe any
copyright in the arrangement of his database;
(39) Whereas, in addition to aiming to protect the copyright in the original
selection or arrangement of the contents of a database, this Directive
seeks to safeguard the position of makers of databases against misappro-
priation of the results of the financial and professional investment made
in obtaining and collection the contents by protecting the whole or sub-
stantial parts of a database against certain acts by a user or competitor;
(40) Whereas the object of this sui generis right is to ensure protection of any
investment in obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents of a
database for the limited duration of the right; whereas such investment
may consist in the deployment of financial resources and/or the expend-
ing of time, effort and energy;
Id.; see also Schneider, supra note 32, at 553 (noting that electronic information industry
was one of fastest growing sectors of EU economy and one that necessitated protection
against free riders).
43. See J.H. Reichman & Paula Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
VAND. L. REV. 51, 66 (1997) (illustrating how low cost and simplicity of copying data
allowed easy exploitation of efforts of original data by free riding competitors); Hayden,
supra note 1, at 215-16 (positing that while computers have increased demand for
databases, computers have also made pirating databases much simpler).
44. See Schneider, supra note 32, at 554 (asserting that Database Directive was
drafted in response to expense, labor, and time investments involved in compilation of
databases); Jasper A. Bovenberg, Should Genomics Companies Set Up Database in Europe?
The E. U. Database Protection Directive Revisited, [2001] EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 361, 362
(pinpointing predominant objective of Database Directive as fostering European
database industry). The European Commission acknowledged that databases are ex-
pensive to create but inexpensive to copy and decided that creators of databases should
be afforded adequate legal protection to ensure they receive a return on their invest-
ment in building the database. Id.
45. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 1(2) (defining database). Article 1
states:
SCOPE
1. This Directive concerns the legal protection of databases in any form.
2. For the purposes of this Directive, 'database' shall mean a collection of
independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or
methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other means.
3. Protection under this Directive shall not apply to computer programs used
in the making or operation of databases accessible by electronic means.
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database must be individually accessible in order to obtain pro-
tection under the Directive.46 Scholars explain that this is a
broad definition drafted with the intent to include electronic
databases in addition to more traditional hard copy databases.47
1. Copyright Protection Under the Database Directive
Copyright for databases under the Directive is protected by
a form of author's right.4" This protects the original selection or
arrangement of contents, but not the contents themselves.49 The
term of copyright protection extends seventy years after the
death of the author.5 °
46. See id. art. 1(2).
47. See Robert Carolina, The European Database Directive: An Introduction For Practi-
tioners, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Sept. 1996, at 17, 18 (explaining how database protections
apply to materials necessary for operation of certain databases such as indexation sys-
tems); Schneider, supra note 32, at 551 (viewing Directive as response to advances in
digital technology).
48. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 3(1) (stating which databases are
eligible for copyright protection). Article 3 provides:
Object of protection
1. In accordance with this Directive, databases which, by reason of the selec-
tion or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's own intellec-
tual creation shall be protected as such by copyright. No other criteria shall
be applied to determine their eligibility for that protection.
2. The copyright protection of databases provided for by this Directive shall
not extend to their contents and shall be without prejudice to any rights
subsisting in those contents themselves.
Id.; see also Kevin Paul Martin, Comment, Legislative Developments: Database Protection, 3
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 158, 159 (1997) (remarking that database author has legal rights to
that database). The author may be either a natural person or a cluster of natural per-
sons. Id. In a commercial context, rights to the database may accrue to either the
employer or the employee-author of the database. Id. The decision of who receives
this right falls on the national authorities of the individual Member States. Id.
49. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 3(2); see also Univ. of London Press v.
Univ. Tutorial Press, 2 Ch. 601, 608-09 (Eng. 1916) (discussing originality). In Univer-
sity of London Press, the court stated:
The word "original" does not in this connection mean that the work must be
the expression of original or inventive thought. Copyright Acts are not con-
cerned with the originality of ideas, but with the expression of thought, and,
in the case of "literary work", with the expression of thought in print or writ-
ing. The originality which is required relates to the expression of thought.
But the Act does not require that the expression must be in an original or
novel form, but that the work must not be copied form another work-that it
should originate from the author.
Id.
50. See Database Directive, supra note 13, recital 25 (stating "[w]hereas the term of
copyright is already governed by Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 har-
monizing the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (6)"); see also
2002] LEGISLATING THE GOLDEN RULE 1001
Copyright protection under the Directive depends on
whether the structure of the database is the author's original in-
tellectual work, with no qualitative criteria being applied.5 1 Ex-
perts agree that most collections of factual data, especially those
arranged in a predictable or ordinary manner, lack the requisite
originality to earn copyright protection.52 However, if a database
qualifies for copyright protection by virtue of its selection or ar-
rangement, its copyright protects it for the same term as for any
other literary work.53
Schneider, supra note 32, at 557 n.48 (explaining that term of protection is life plus
seventy years because this right falls within Berne Convention for Protection of Literary
Works ("Berne Convention")); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works of Sept. 9, 1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on
Nov. 13, 1908, revised at Berne on Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, revised
at Brussels on June 26, 1948, revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, revised at Paris on
July 24, 1971, amended on Oct. 2, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986), art. 7, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
51. See Jens L. Gaster, The New EU Directive Concerning the Legal Protection of
Databases, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1129, 1135-36 (1997) (discussing Database Directive's
originality requirement). The European Parliament and European Council of Minis-
ters ("Council") drafted the Database Directive with the intent that all categories of
copyrightable works had to be taken into account. Id. The same standard that applied
to computers was applied to databases. Id.
52. See id. (surmising that Database Directive's originality requirement is more
than de minimis); Michael F. Morano, Note, Legislating in the Face of New Technology: Copy-
right Laws for the Digital Age, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1374, 1401 (1997) (asserting that
Database Directive conditions protection on originality of database). Originality is satis-
fied if the selection and arrangement of the contents are a product of the author's
work. Id.; Cf Mitchell, supra note 17, at 908 (explaining difficulty in proving originality
for factual compilations after U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Feist).
53. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 9(1) (explaining sui generis protec-
tion). Article 9 states:
Exceptions to the sui generis right
Member States may stipulate that lawful users of a database which is made
available to the public in whatever manner may, without the authorization of
its maker, extract or re-utilize a substantial part of its contents:
(a) in the case of extraction for private purposes of the contents of a non-
electronic database;
(b) in the case of extraction for the purposes of illustration for teaching or
scientific research, as long as the source is indicated and to the extent
justified by the non-commercial purpose to be achieved;
(c) in the case of extraction and/or reutilization for the purposes of public
security or an administrative or judicial procedure.
Id.; see also Database Directive, supra note 12, recitals 15, 16 (addressing originality re-
quirement). Recitals 15 and 16 state:
(15) Whereas the criteria used to determine whether a database should be
protected by copyright should be defined to the fact that the selection or
the arrangement of the contents of the database is the author's own in-
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The Directive harmonizes and eliminates existing differ-
ences in the copyright law within the EU.54 The Directive uses a
traditional copyright standard for the level of creativity necessary
to merit copyright protection.55 The Directive requires a "modi-
cum of creativity" and leaves to the Member State legislatures
and the European Court of Justice, the further development of
the creativity standards.56
2. Sui Generis Protection Under the Database Directive
Experts discuss how the sui generis right provided by the
Database Directive creates a right that exceeds the protection
provided by the copyright law of most nations.57 Member States
must provide a new sui generis right to the maker of a database
when the maker can show a "substantial investment" in ob-
taining, verifying, or presenting the database's contents.5" The
tellectual creation; whereas such protection should cover the structure of
the database;
(16) Whereas no criterion other than originality in the sense of the author's
intellectual creation should be applied to determine the eligibility of the
database for copyright protection, and in particular no aesthetic or quali-
tative criteria should be applied[.]
Id.; see also Anant S. Narayanan, Note, Standards of Protection for Databases in the European
Community and the United States: Feist and the Myth of Creative Originality, 27 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 457, 474 (1994) (articulating substantive provisions of Database Direc-
tive); cf 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-35 (offering U.S. protection terms ranging from 50 to 75 years
for literary and visual works).
54. See Martin, supra note 48, at 158 (commenting that Database Directive harmo-
nizes copyright protection among Member States of EU); Schneider, supra note 32, at
557 (discussing how Database Directive derogates "sweat of the brow" copyright regime
in United Kingdom and Ireland). The approach taken by the United Kingdom and
Ireland protected the effort incurred in the creation of a work rather than the creative
value of its content. Id. Consequently, the United Kingdom required a lower standard
of eligibility for protection than that traditionally required in the rest of Europe, where
the emphasis has been on the creative input of the author. Id.
55. SeeJoYcE ET AL., supra note 9, at 91 (explaining traditional copyright standard
for originality as independent creation by author and modest quantum of creativity).
56. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 7(5); see generally Hunsucker, supra
note 40 at 726-27 (explaining how Database Directive purposely left definition of "sub-
stantial part" to European Court of Justice).
57. See Michael J. Bastian, Protection of "Noncreative" Databases: Harmonization of
United States, Foreign and International Law, 22 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. Rv. 425, 444-45
(1999) (summarizing sui generis protection provided by Database Directive).
58. See Database Directive, supra note 13, recital 39 & art. 7(4) (articulating goal to
safeguard database producers from misappropriations of their work through sui generis
right); see also Mary Maureen Brown et. al., Database Protection in a Digital World, 6 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 2, 80 (1999), at http://www.richmond.edu/JOLT/vbil/conley.html (de-
fining maker of database as individual or business who takes initiative in constructing
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sui generis right also grants to the maker a bundle of exclusive
rights capable of being transferred, assigned, or granted under
contractual license.59 However, the sui generis right may not
prejudice other rights in the contents of the database.6 ° The sui
generis right protects qualifying databases from the moment of
completion and provides for an additional fifteen years of pro-
tection if the creator makes a "substantial new investment" in the
database.6" The sui generis right bans substantial extraction or
reutilization of a database's contents by all unauthorized users. 6 2
There are several exceptions to the sui generis right.6" The
database and who assumes pecuniary risk). The maker may be different than the au-
thor of the database. Id. This allows different persons or companies to hold the copy-
right and sui generis right in a particular database. Id.
59. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 7(3) (allowing transfer, assignment,
or grant of sui genefis right by contract); see also Gaster, supra note 1, at 1145 (explaining
how Database Directive consists of bundle of rights that are transferable, can be li-
censed, and can be cumulated with other rights); Martin, supra note 48, at 159 (indicat-
ing that sui generis protection is granted in recognition of substantial efforts and funds
required to make database).
60. See Simon Chalton, The Effect of the EC Database Directive on United Kingdom Copy-
right Law in Relation to Databases: A Comparison of Features, [1997] EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 279, 289 (1997) (asserting that it is immaterial whether database is or is not pro-
tected by copyright under Database Directive). It is also immaterial whether the
database is or is not a product of human creativity. Id. Rather, the investment criteria
requires that there has been a qualitative or quantitative substantial investment in ob-
taining, verifying, or presenting the contents. Id.; see also Robert Shaposka, Note, A
Criticism of the E. U. Directive Protecting Computer Software, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 519, 537-38
(1997) (discussing terms of protection under Berne Convention and sui generis ap-
proaches and examining what constitutes "substantial" investment). Substantial invest-
ment is not explicitly defined in the Directive and it remains unclear when copyright's
fair use defense may be applied. Id. at 537.
61. Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 7(1); see Bastian, supra note 57, at 442-43
(noting if database maker can prove substantial investment in obtaining, verifying, or
presenting database contents, database is eligible for sui generis protection); Caster,
supra note 1, at 1147 (explaining that burden of proof for substantial new investment
lies with maker of database). Database makers are advised to take sufficient measures to
secure evidence of substantial new investment. Id. In certain cases, marking the date
that changes were added to the database may be helpful to prove substantial new invest-
ment. Id.
62. See J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 803
(1999) (discussing basic substantive principles of sui generis right); Bastian, supra note
57, at 442 (defining "extraction" as "a transfer of the database contents to another me-
dium by any means or in any form including temporary transfers such as on-screen
display" and defining "re-utilization" as "making the database contents available to the
public whether by distribution of copies or some form of transmission").
63. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 9 (outlining exceptions to sui generis
fight).
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first exception is for "public lending," which is specifically ex-
empted from the definitions of extraction and re-utilization.64
In addition, a creator of a database may not prevent in any way a
lawful user of the database from extracting or re-utilizing insub-
stantial parts of the contents of the database.65
In addition to these mandatory exemptions, Member States
are given the option to limit the sui generis right.6 6 Member
States may allow unauthorized users to extract or re-utilize a sub-
stantial part of the contents of a database, provided these extrac-
tions are for private purposes and are taken from a non-elec-
tronic database.67 Member States may also allow unauthorized
extractions for teaching or scientific research, and for public se-
64. See Database Directive, supra note 12, art. 7(2) (b) (stating "[p]ublic lending is
not an act of extraction or re-utilization"); see also Gaster, supra note 1, at 1146-47 (as-
serting that excluding reutilization is appropriate because reutilization is predomi-
nantly commercial activity).
65. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 8(1), recital 49 (articulating excep-
tions to sui generis right). Article 8(1) provides:
The maker of a database which is made available to the public in whatever
manner may not prevent a lawful user of the database from extracting and/or
re-utilizing insubstantial parts of its contents, evaluated qualitatively and/or
quantitatively, for any purposes whatsoever. Where the lawful user is author-
ized to extract and/or re-utilize only part of the database, this paragraph shall
apply only to that part.
Id. Recital 49 provides:
Whereas, notwithstanding the right to prevent extraction and/or reutilization
of all or a substantial part of a database, it should be laid down that the maker
of a database or rightholder may not prevent a lawful user of the database
from extracting and re-utilizing insubstantial parts; whereas, however, that
user may not unreasonably prejudice either the legitimate interests of the
holder of the sui generis right or the holder of copyright or a related right in
respect of the works or subject matter contained in the database.
Id.; see also Bastian, supra note 57, at 442 (noting exceptions from definitions of extrac-
tion and re-utilization).
66. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 9 (providing optional exceptions to
sui generis right); see also Bastian, supra note 57, at 443 (explaining that in addition to
mandatory exceptions to sui generis right, Member States have the option of limiting sui
generis right in specific circumstances).
67. See Database Directive, supra note 13, recital 50, art. 9(a)-(c) (articulating op-
tional limitations on sui generis right). Recital 50 states:
Whereas the Member States should be given the option of providing for ex-
ceptions to the ight to prevent the unauthorized extraction and/or re-utiliza-
tion of a substantial part of the contents of a database in the case of extraction
for private purposes, for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific
research, or where extraction and/or re-utilization are/is carried out in the
interests of public security or for the purposes of an administrative or judicial
procedure; whereas such operations must not prejudice the exclusive rights of
the maker to exploit the database and their purpose must not be commercial.
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curity or an administrative or judicial procedure.6"
3. Comparable Protection of EU Non-Member Databases
The sui generis right is available to databases made by corpo-
rations or persons in the EU Member Nations.69 The Database
Directive does not extend to individuals and entities outside the
EU unless they reside in or were incorporated or formed in a
jurisdiction which provides comparable protection for EU
databases.7" Commentators note that because current U.S. law
does not reciprocate protection, and most database producers
are not established in Europe, the Directive places U.S. compa-
nies in a difficult position within the European market.71
Id.; see also Bastian, supra note 57, at 442 (noting non-commercial purposes exist when
extraction is from non-electronic database and for private purpose).
68. See Database Directive, supra note 13, recital 50, art. 9(a)-(c) (providing Mem-
ber States with optional limitations on sui generis right); see also Bastian, supra note 57, at
442 (asserting extraction is reasonable for purpose of teaching or scientific research as
long as source is given credit, or extraction and/or re-utilization is for purpose of pub-
lic security or administrative or judicial procedure).
69. Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 11. Article 11 states:
Beneficiaries of protection under the sui generis right
1. The right provided for in Article 7 shall apply to database whose makers or
rightholders are nationals of a Member State or who have their habitual
residence in the territory of the Community.
2. Paragraph 1 shall also apply to companies and firms formed in accordance
with the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central
administration or principal place of business within the Community; how-
ever, where such a company or firm has only its registered office in the
territory of the Community, its operations must be genuinely linked on an
ongoing basis with the economy of a Member State.
Id.; see e.g., Sean C. Monaghan, Comment, European Union Legal Personality Disorder: The
Union's Legal Nature Through the Prism of the German Federal Constitutional Court's Maas-
tricht Decision, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1443, 1503 n.2 (1998) (listing Member Nations of
EU in order of accession as Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland,
and Sweden).
70. See Database Directive, supra note 13, recital 56. Recital 56 states:
Whereas the right to prevent unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization in
respect of a database should apply to databases whose makers are nationals or
habitual residents of third countries or to those produced by legal persons not
established in a Member State, within the meaning of the Treaty, only if such
third countries offer comparable protection to databases produced by nation-
als of a Member State or persons who have their habitual residence in the
territory of the Community.
Id.
71. SeeJason R. Boyarski, Note, The Heist of Feist: Protection For Collections of Informa-
tion and the Possible Federalization of "Hot News", 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 871, 907-08 (1999)
(maintaining Database Directive creates disadvantage for U.S. database producers).
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The European Council of Ministers acting upon a proposal
from the European Commission decides whether a non-EU na-
tion provides legal protection comparable to that of the Direc-
tive. 7 2 Some legal commentators note that the comparable pro-
tection provision of the Database Directive provides the EU with
leverage in negotiations with its trading partners.73 Other legal
commentators posit that the Berne Convention prohibits the EU
from denying the protections afforded by the Database Direc-
tive's sui generis right to signatories, including the United States,
regardless of whether these States provide comparable protec-
tion. 4
The U.S. Congress has not passed a bill that satisfies the
comparable protection standard. 75  At least one commentator
notes that the Commission is silent regarding the possibility of
U.S. reciprocity but hopes that the United States will implement
legislation that will satisfy the comparable protection standard.76
In order to achieve this goal, the Commission refrained from
Since the United States produces the majority of the world's databases, the comparable
protection provision can be interpreted as permission to steal for unethical overseas
competitors. Id.; Grame B. Dinwoodie, The Integration of International and Domestic Intel-
lectual Property Lawmaking, 23 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 307, 315 n.34 (2000) (arguing
Database Directive placed international pressure for enactment of U.S. database law);
Schneider, supra note 32, at 562 (commenting that Database Directive's reciprocity re-
quirement exerted pressure on United States to adopt sui generis protection).
72. Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 11(3).
73. See Mark Powell, The European Union's Database Directive: An International Anti-
dote to the Side Effects of Feist?, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1251, 1251 (1997) (discussing
comparative advantage Database Directive gives EU in trade negotiations with other
nations); Freno, supra note 7, at 225 (asserting that under current international frame-
work, U.S. database makers cannot achieve any protection for non-creative databases
unless Congress enacts legislation comparable to Database Directive).
74. See Bastian, supra note 57, at 446 (arguing that Berne Convention requires
minimum set of standards of protection for authors and mandates "national treatment"
of authors of signatory States). As a result, any application of material reciprocity that
denies an author "national treatment" is a violation of the Berne Convention, even if
rights granted to an author are far greater than the minimums imposed by the Berne
Convention. Id.; Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the
Future, 3J.L. & TECH. 1, 16-17 (1988) (asserting fundamental principle of Berne is na-
tional treatment). Under national treatment, Berne signatories must grant authors
who are nationals of other Berne countries the same protection they give to their own
nationals. Id.; see, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 50, art. 5(1), (2).
75. See Freno, supra note 7, at 197 (discussing how House Bill 1858 would have
failed to provide reciprocal sui generis protection to EU Member Nations).
76. See Hugh Hansen et. al., Panel I: Database Protection, 11 FoRDHAm INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 275, 302-03 (2001) (suggesting that EU wants United States to offer
comparable protection thus enabling EU .and United States to lobby World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO") for worldwide treaty on database protection).
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issuing statements that would lead the U.S. Congress to believe a
U.S. law would necessarily fail to meet the comparable protec-
tion standard.77
C. Protection of Databases in the United States
Copyright is the customary form of database protection in
the United States. 78  Historically, common law protected
databases under the "sweat of the brow" doctrine until the
landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Feist v. Rural Telephone
Service.79 After the Feist decision, database protection was tenu-
ous at best. ° Recently, the U.S. House of Representatives pro-
posed H.R. 354, a database protection bill that, if passed, would
provide protection for database makers against misappropria-
tions of their work. 1
77. See id. (explaining how European Commission has not made statements to dis-
parage United States database efforts in hopes of gaining U.S. reciprocal protection).
78. See Hoeren, supra note 21, at 64 (indicating United States currently uses copy-
right to protect databases). Existing copyright law, however, is not sufficient to protect
databases. Id.; Stacey King, Are We Ready to Answer the Question? Baker v. Selden, The
Post-Feist Era, and Database Protections, 41 J.L. & TECH. 65 (2001) (arguing that tradition
of copyright protection for databases began after patent protection was denied to
databases in late 1800s); Mitchell, supra note 17, at 901 (remarking that beginning in
eighteenth century, copyright law protected authorship of databases).
79. See 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (holding sufficient originality in selection or ar-
rangement of facts in database is necessary for copyright protection); see also Bastian,
supra note 57, at 447-48 (explaining that before Feist, expenditure of labor and capital
was enough to allow copyright in database); Freno, supra note 7, at 168 (articulating
that before Feist, protection was granted to databases if author showed sufficient effort
and expense in creating database).
80. See Baron, supra note 27, at 899-900 (claiming Feist left databases with minimal
protection). Feist left database producers with no protection in the marketplace against
piracy from competitors and users. Id.; Freno, supra note 7, at 169 (arguing database
protection since Feist is negligible); Amy C. Sullivan, Ven the Creative is the Enemy of the
True: Database Protection in the U.S. and Abroad, 29 AIPLA QUARTERLYJ. 317, 365 (2001)
(noting that concern over database vulnerability began after U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Feist).
81. See H.R. 354, supra note 17 (providing protection of databases from unautho-
rized users); Aaron Karnell, The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act: Creating an Intel-
lectual Property Right in Facts, 28 S.U. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2000) (explaining goal of H.R. 354 is
to eliminate inequity that allows competitors to copy contents of database at no cost
without negative consequences); Daniel R. Valente, Feist Overruled? Database Protection
in the Next Century, 17 COMPUTER LAWYER 20, 21 (2000) (reporting purpose of H.R. 354
is to encourage investment in new databases that are not adequately protected by cur-
rent U.S. copyright law).
1008 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:987
1. Common Law Protection
U.S. law traditionally uses copyright protection to protect
databases.82 Before the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Feist v. Rural Telephone Service,8 U.S. courts granted protection
to databases by examining the effort and investment of the
database maker.84 After the Feist Court held effort and invest-
ment to be insufficient grounds for granting database protec-
tion, databases have been more difficult to protect.8 5 Experts
discuss that H.R. 354 would reinstate the grant of protection to
databases based on the effort and investment of the database
maker.8 6
a. Pre-Feist: "Sweat of The Brow" Doctrine
U.S. copyright law traditionally protected only expressions,
not facts or ideas.8 7 Historically, courts extended copyright law
82. See Hoeren, supra note 21, at 64 (stating United States uses traditional copy-
right law to protect databases). Copyright protection needs to be revised and aug-
mented in order to adequately protect databases. Id.; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 901
(noting that copyright has been used to protect producers of databases since 1700s).
83. 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (holding that to qualify for copyright protection,
work must comprise original work of author); see Chalton, supra note 60, at 278 (noting
that U.S. Supreme Court in Feist held thatoriginality was necessary prerequisite for any
literary work to qualify for protection under U.S. copyright law).
84. See Isenberg, supra note 22 (noting that before Feist, courts rewarded hard
work involved in compiling facts with copyright protection); Richard Keck & Damon
Goode, Of Misappropriated Manure Heaps, Rude Robots and Broken Promises: The Devolving
Law of Database Protection, 57 Bus. LAw. 513 n.31 (2001) (noting that Feist repudiated
earlier law which allowed copyright protection for works lacking originality).
85. See Hayden, supra note 1, at 227 (indicating that U.S. courts now require
database compiler to make subjective decisions in order to pass Feist creativity stan-
dard); King, supra note 78, at 65 (articulating that Feist did not solve problem of decid-
ing which databases to protect); Mitchell, supra note 17, at 902 (explaining that follow-
ing Feist, it is harder to protect databases against misappropriations).
86. See Freno, supra note 7, at 174 (articulating that H.R. 354 grants protection to
factual databases that are created and maintained by substantial monetary investment
or other resources used in commerce); Mitchell, supra note 17, at 916 (commenting
that H.R. 354 attempts to restore to database makers same protection they had before
Feist).
87. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(b) (2001) (stating "[i]n no case does copyright protec-
tion for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which
it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied in such work"); Holmes v. Hurst, 174
U.S. 82, 90 (1899) (holding ideas are not copyrightable); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.,
222 U.S. 55 (1911) (holding copyright only protects expression of ideas); Dymow v.
Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, (2d Cir. 1926) (holding idea for plot in play is not copyrightable);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding original
expressions, but not ideas, are copyrightable); Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d
2002] LEGISLATING THE GOLDEN RULE 1009
to cover some factual databases under the judicially-created
"sweat of the brow" doctrine.8" Under this doctrine, protection
was possible for factual compilations if the author demonstrated
sufficient effort and expense in formulating the final result.8 9
The "sweat of the brow" doctrine afforded the owner of a
database exclusive reproduction rights in his or her work.9°
612, 612 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding monopoly applies only to expression of copyrighted
work). The theme, plot, and ideas may always be freely borrowed from a copyrighted
work. Id.; Gaye v. Gillis, 167 F. Supp. 416, 418 (D. Mass. 1958) (holding copyright does
not extend to system of doing business but only to particular mode of expression of
idea in copyrighted material); see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 16.01 (2001) (discussing limitations of copyright to protection of ideas).
88. See Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83, 92 (2d Cir.
1922) (holding copyright law requires subsequent compilers to invest same labor and
expense that first compiler invested); Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir.
1937) (indicating that compilations are copyrightable because of originality of combi-
nation); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937) (illustrating princi-
ple that one should not freely benefit from industry of another in finding factual infor-
mation or other public domain material). The plaintiff in Leon compiled a telephone
directory with the names and telephone numbers listed in alphabetical order. Id. at
484-85. Defendant copied the names and numbers from plaintiffs directory, arranging
them in numerical order. Id. While defendant did not copy plaintiff's arrangement,
copying the names and numbers was sufficient to constitute infringement. Id. at 485-
86. The decision protected the industriousness of the researcher. Id. at 486; Banks v.
McDivitt, 2 F. Cas. 759 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1875) (No. 961) (holding copyrighted compila-
tions may not be freely copied); Amplex Mfg. Co. v. ABC Plastic Fabricators, Inc., 184 F.
Supp. 285, 287-88 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (holding extensive effort in producing compilation is
sufficient to obtain copyright protection); Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive
Corp., 492 F.2d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1974) (noting infringement of compilation occurs
when reasonable person cannot differentiate between two works); see also NIMMER, supra
note 87, § 3.04[B] [1] (2001) (discussing evolution of "sweat of the brow" doctrine).
89. See Freno, supra note 7, at 168 (discussing U.S. copyright protection of
databases before 1991). Copyright protection applied to factual compilations that were
created at sufficient labor and expense to the compiler of the database. Id.; Jane C.
Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v.
Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 339 (1992) (recognizing that before Feist,
directories and other compilations were able to secure copyright protection).
90. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (enumerating exclusive rights of copyright owner).
Section 106 provides in pertinent part:
[T]he owner of a copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and
to authorize the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual work, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individ-
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b. The Originality Requirement
In 1991, in the Feist case, the U.S. Supreme Court abolished
the "sweat of the brow" doctrine by instituting an originality re-
quirement on every copyrightable work.91 Rural Telephone
Company ("Rural") published a white pages phone book for the
local area it serviced.9 2 Feist Publications ("Feist") published a
directory covering multiple service areas, including Rural's.9" Af-
ter Rural refused to give Feist, a license to use Rural's directory,
Feist copied the directory without permission.94 While Feist was
ual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copy-
righted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.
91. 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) (defining originality as work independently created
by author and possessing modicum of creativity); see also Chalton, supra note 60, at 278
(remarking that United States faced direct challenge to "sweat of the brow" doctrine in
Feist). The U.S. Supreme Court in Feist held that originality was a necessary prerequisite
for any literary work to qualify for protection under U.S. copyright law. Id.
92. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 342 (indicating that Rural Telephone Company ("Rural")
is certified public utility that provides telephone service to many communities in north-
west Kansas). Rural Telephone Company ("Rural") is subject to a state regulation that
requires all telephone companies doing business in Kansas to publish annually a tele-
phone directory consisting of white pages and yellow pages. Id. The white pages list in
alphabetical order the names of Rural's subscribers, while the yellow pages list Rural's
business subscribers alphabetically by category. Id. Rural distributes its directory at no
cost to its subscribers. Id. Rural makes a profit on the directory by selling yellow page
advertisements. Id.
93. See id. at 342-43 (noting that Feist Publications ("Feist") is publishing company
with specialization in area-wide telephone directories). Feist Publication's ("Feist") di-
rectory differs from typical directories in that Feist's directory covers a much larger
geographical area. Id. at 342. This reduces the need to call directory assistance or
check with several directories. Id. at 343. The Feist subject directory covers eleven
different telephone service areas in 15 counties and contains 46,878 white page listings.
Id. Rural's directory, in contrast, contains approximately 7,700 listings. Id. Feist's di-
rectory, like Rural's, is distributed at no cost and includes both white and yellow pages.
Id. Feist and Rural are direct competitors for yellow pages advertising. Id.
94. See id. at 343 (explaining that Feist is not telephone company and lacks inde-
pendent access to subscriber information). Of the eleven telephone companies Feist
solicited for subscriber information, only Rural refused to license its listings to Feist. Id.
The absence of this information would have left Feist's directory with an information
gap in its area-wide directory. Id. Potentially, Feist's directory may have been less lucra-
tive to advertisers. Id. Feist then used Rural's listings without Rural's consent. Id. Feist
removed several thousand listings that were outside the geographic range of its area-
wide directory and then hired personnel to investigate the remaining listings and addi-
tional information. Id. As a result, Feist's directory included street listings that Rural's
directory did not include. Id. at 344. Aside from these additions, 1,309 of the 46,878
listings in Feist's 1983 directory were identical to listings in Rural's 1982-1983 white
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found liable in both the district and the circuit courts, the Su-
preme Court reversed.95 The Supreme Court rejected the "sweat
of the brow" doctrine, holding that protection is possible only if
the collection involves both a modicum of creativity and original-
ity in its compilation.96
c. Post-Feist Protection
At least one expert states that the Supreme Court's decision
in Feist left two important questions unanswered: First, what con-
stitutes originality or creativity in the selection, coordination, or
arrangement of information?97 Second, if the selection, coordi-
pages. Id. Four of these listings were fictitious listings that Rural inserted to identify
piracy. Id.
95. See id. at 344, 364 (holding that Rural's white pages lack requisite originality);
Rural Tel. Service Co. v. Feist Publ'n, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 220 (D. Kan. 1987) (hold-
ing Feist liable for copyright infringement); Rural Tel. Service Co. v. Feist Publ'n, 916
F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirmed without opinion). As a result, Feist's use of Rural's
listings does not constitute infringement. Feist, 499 U.S. at 364. The "sweat of the brow"
doctrine was rejected because it extended copyright protection in a compilation be-
yond the selection and arrangement of facts to the facts themselves. Id. at 354. The
protection of facts counters one of the most important principles of copyright law, no
one may copyright facts or ideas. Id.
96. See id. at 346 (concluding that originality required two components, "indepen-
dent creation plus a modicum of creativity."). Facts are not created, but merely discov-
ered. Id. at 347, 350; see also Yochai Benkler, Symposium, Constitutional Bounds of
Database Protection: The Role ofJudicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights
in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 575-76 (2000) (arguing that while copyright
law could not protect actual facts compiled, it could protect creative element of compi-
lation including its organization or selectivity); cf Terry M. Sanks, Comment, Database
Protection: National and International Attempts to Provide Legal Protection for Databases, 25
FLA. ST. U.L. REv 991, 1001-03 (1998) (discussing current interpretations of originality
requirement instituted in Feist). Even while following Feist, however, the Eleventh and
Second Circuits have taken two different approaches to the originality requirement. Id.
at 1000. The Eleventh Circuit assesses databases based on the selection and organiza-
tion of information. Id. The Second Circuit evaluates databases by applying the
merger doctrine selectively. Id.; JOYCE ET AL., supra note 9, at § 2.02 (defining "merger
doctrine" used by Second Circuit to interpret originality requirement). The merger
doctrine is defined as "the principle that, where there exist only a very limited number
of ways of expressing an idea, none of those expressions should enjoy protection." Id.
Allowing copyright in these expressions would result in a potential monopoly on the
underlying idea itself, because it would be impossible to develop an independent ex-
pression of the idea that would be substantially different from the copyrighted expres-
sion. Id.; see, e.g., Bellsouth Advertising & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publ'g, Inc.,
933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991).
97. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 905 (pointing out that while Supreme Court's
decision in Feist eliminated "sweat of the brow" doctrine for protecting factual informa-
tion contained in databases, it left unanswered two critical questions relating to origi-
nality and creativity); but see Benkler, supra note 96 (arguing that it is not well settled
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nation, or arrangement is adequately original to merit copyright
protection, what type of copying does it prevent?98 After Feist,
lower courts addressing these questions often provide little copy-
right protection for databases.99
In Kregos v. Associated Press,'00 Kregos brought suit alleging
copyright infringement for the unauthorized copying of his
baseball pitching form, which kept statistics about a pitcher's
performance.'01 Kregos registered his form with the Copyright
Office and received a copyright for his form. 1 2 In 1984, Associ-
ated Press ("AP") initiated the publication of a pitching form
provided by Sports Features. 10 3 The AP's 1984 form was nearly
identical to Kregos' 1983 form. 10 4 The AP created another form
that Feist abrogated "sweat of the brow" doctrine). Benkler argues that the Supreme
Court only acknowledged and adopted the general trend among lower federal courts to
deny protection to factual information at the constitutional level. Id.
98. See Hayden, supra note 1, at 227 (noting that Feist provides little guidance in
answering questions it presents); Mitchell, supra note 1, at 905 (explaining that Feist
eliminated "sweat of the brow" doctrine and left two unanswered questions in its place).
99. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., Inc., 932 F.2d 610, 611 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding white pages of telephone directory are not copyrightable); Bellsouth Adver. &
Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publ'g, Inc., 933 F.2d 952, 961 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding
yellow pages are copyrightable); Key Publ'n, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enter.,
Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding yellow pages copyrightable because
selection and arrangement of names was original); Narayanan, supra note 53, at 467-69
(examining different standards applied to copyright infringement by U.S. courts after
Supreme Court's decision in Feist).
100. 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
101. Id. at 701-02 (noting Kregos' form is distributed to newspapers). The pitch-
ing form displays information regarding past performances of the opposing pitchers
scheduled to start each day's baseball games. Id. at 702; contra Kregos v. Associated
Press, 731 F. Supp 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affirmed in part and reversed in part, Kregos, 937
F.2d at 711 (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, ruling as matter of
law that defendant's pitching form displayed sufficient creativity to satisfy originality
requirement for copyright protection).
102. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 702 (explaining how Kregos' registered form is rede-
sign of earlier form he developed during 1970s). Kregos distributed his form, listing
four items of information about each day's baseball game, to subscribing newspapers
with statistics. Id. at 703. The form lists the teams, the starting pitchers, the game time,
and the betting odds, and then lists nine pieces of information about each pitcher's
past performances, grouped into three categories. Id. The controversy in this case ap-
plies only to Kregos' selection of categories of statistics appearing on his form. Id.
103. Id. at 702.
104. See id. (noting that in 1986, Associated Press ("AP") and Sports Features
changed their form so that it was no longer virtually identical). It was undisputed that
before Kregos created his 1983 form, no one form had listed the same nine items. Id.
at 705. Some items had never even appeared in other forms. Id. In the earlier forms,
the few items that were in both the Associated Press ("AP") and Kregos' forms were
grouped with different items. Id. For example, Siegel's 1978 form noted the won/lost
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in 1986 that contained six of Kregos' nine items, but also in-
cluded four items that Kregos did not have. 105
The Second Circuit found that Kregos' pitching form was
likely sufficient in its selection to satisfy the originality require-
ment of copyright protection. 10 6 However, this was followed by a
finding that AP most likely did not infringe on Kregos' copy-
right.1"7 The court held that Kregos only obtained a copyright
by displaying the requisite creativity in selecting his statistics, and
if another party should display the requisite creativity in a man-
ner that is more than trivially different, there would be no in-
fringement.10
In Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enter-
prises, Inc. the plaintiff sued the defendants for infringing its cop-
yright in a published telephone directory for the Chinese-Ameri-
can community. 109 Key Publications, Inc. ("Key") published an
annual classified business directory for New York City's Chinese-
American community.110 Beginning in 1983, Key collected busi-
ness cards from local businesses that frequently served the Chi-
record and earned run average for the season but did not contain any "at site" informa-
tion nor information for recent starts. Id. It contained only two of Kregos' nine items.
Id.
105. See id. at 709-10 (noting that Kregos can only prevail against other forms that
copied his selection, which is not clear with AP's 1986 form).
106. Id. at 702.
107. Id. at 710.
108. See id. (explaining that if Kregos makes decision to select, then competitor's
decision to select something else in that same category is not infringement). For exam-
ple:
If his decision to select, in the category of performance against the opposing
team, statistics for the pitcher's current season at the site of today's game dis-
plays, in combination with his other selections, enough creativity to merit cop-
yright protection, then a competitor's decision to select in that same category
performance statistics for the pitcher's season performance both home and
away may well insulate the competitor from a claim of infringement.
Id.; see also Mitchell, supra note 17, at 905 (arguing that to prevail on issue of infringe-
ment on remand, Kregos would need to prove that selection AP used in drafting its own
form was virtually identical to his own); see also Hayden, supra note 1, at 239 (arguing
that Kregos decision offered little comfort to database developers due to fact that court
seems to have drawn arbitrary line for protection).
109. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding defendants had not infringed plaintiffs
copyright because directory satisfied compilation test that qualified it for copyright pro-
tection, did not have many yellow page business categories in common with plaintiffs
similar directory, and had only minor overlap in listings).
110. See id. at 511 (explaining that each directory has white pages section and yel-
low pages section). The white pages are printed in both English and Chinese and have
maps, articles, and information about government and private services. Id. The yellow
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nese-American community and included these cards in its direc-
tory.11 1 In 1990, the defendant, Chinatown Today Publishing
Enterprises, Inc. ("Chinatown Today") began publishing an-
other classified directory for the New York Chinese-American
community. 12  About seventy-five percent of the businesses
listed in Chinatown Today's directory were also listed in Key's
directory. 1
The Second Circuit held that infringement required a sub-
stantial amount of copying of the copyrightable, not the public
domain, elements of the directory." 4 The Second Circuit found
that the arrangement of the two directories were not remotely
similar to one another since the Chinatown Today directory con-
tained only twenty-eight different categories while the Key direc-
tory contained over 260 categories." 5 According to the court,
the two compilations were almost entirely dissimilar and the
court held in favor of Chinatown Today." 6
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Feist, the Elev-
enth Circuit granted even less protection to databases than the
Second Circuit." 7 In Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v.
Donnelley Information Publications, Inc.,118 Bellsouth sued Donnel-
ley for infringing its compilation copyright in a yellow pages di-
pages are about two-thirds of the directory, and contain telephone numbers and ad-
dresses for Chinatown businesses. Id.
111. See id. (noting that "modest percentage" of listings in 1984 Key Directory were
copied from another compilation).
112. See id. (noting that Chinatown Today's yellow pages contained approximately
2,000 listings divided into 28 different categories of businesses that would be of interest
to Chinese-American community).
113. See id. (explaining that while many of duplicated listings are contained in
similar categories in both directories, arrangement of categories can be distinguished
because placing listings within categories is mechanical and does not warrant copyright
protection).
114. See id. at 514 (noting that individual components of compilation are usually
within public domain and are free to copy).
115. See id. at 515 (finding that "a facial examination thus readily reveals great
dissimilarity"). Only three of the 28 categories appearing in the Chinatown Today Di-
rectory duplicated categories in the Key Directory. Id. at 514 (citing Kregos, 937 F.2d at
709).
116. See id.
117. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 908 (explaining how, like Second Circuit, Elev-
enth Circuit found that copying substantial portions of database was not infringement
because selection and arrangement of information was not sufficiently creative to war-
rant copyright protection).
118. 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993).
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rectory. 19 Both parties conceded that Bellsouth had a compila-
tion copyright in the directory as a whole, and that the only ele-
ments of a database entitled to copyright protection are the
selection, coordination, and arrangement of the information as
they appear in the work as a unit.120  Donnelly also admitted
that, for the purpose of creating a competing yellow pages, it
entered into its computer the name, address, telephone num-
ber, and business type of each advertiser in Bellsouth's direc-
tory. On these facts, the district court found that Donnelly
infringed upon Bellsouth's compilation.' 22
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's
decision.1 2' The court held that the selection, coordination, and
arrangement of the plaintiff's directory did not meet the level of
originality and creativity required by Feist.1 24  Bellsouth "se-
119. See id. at 1439 (stating Bellsouth Advertising and Publishing Corporation
("Bellsouth") sued Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc. ("Donnelley") for copyright
infringement, trademark infringement, and unfair competition). Bellsouth Advertising
and Publishing Corporation ("Bellsouth") publishes a yellow pages directory for Miami.
Id. at 1438. The Bellsouth directory is organized into an alphabetical list of business
classifications. Id. Each business telephone subscriber is listed in alphabetical order
under one appropriate classification at no charge. Id. A subscriber may opt to
purchase cross listings under different classifications or purchase advertisements in the
directory. Id. After Bellsouth published its 1984 directory, Donnelley Information Pub-
lishing, Inc. ("Donnelley") began promoting and selling classified advertisements for a
competing yellow pages directory. Id. Donnelley gave copies of Bellsouth's directory to
a data entry company to generate a list of businesses to solicit for Donnelley's own
directory. Id. at 1439. Donnelley relied on the information copied from the Bellsouth
directory to compile its own directory for Miami. Id.
120. See id. at 1438 (explaining that parties agreed only elements entitled to copy-
right protection are "selection, arrangement, or coordination as they appear in the
work as a whole"). Bellsouth and Donnelley did not agree on what elements of a yellow
pages directory constitute the selection, arrangement, or coordination. Id.
121. See id. at 1439 (stating that Donnelley conceded it copied Bellsouth's direc-
tory into computer database). For each listing in the Bellsouth directory, Donnelley
created a computer database with the name, address, and telephone number of the
subscriber. Id. Donnelley also noted the business type and unit of advertising in the
Bellsouth directory. Id.
122. See id. (noting district court denied Bellsouth's motion for preliminary injunc-
tion); BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, 719 F. Supp. 1551,
1554 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (noting earlier refusal to issue preliminary injunction to Bell-
south). The district court later granted summary judgment to Bellsouth and denied
Donnelley's motion for partial summary judgment. See id. at 1569 (ordering summary
judgment for Bellsouth)
123. See Bellsouth, 999 F.2d at 1439 n.5 (positing that district court should have
granted summary judgment to Donnelley).
124. See id. at 1444 (holding headings used by Bellsouth are not distinct and origi-
nal to Bellsouth).
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lected" its listings by requiring its subscribers to use a business
telephone service. 125 The court found this selection of facts was
not sufficiently creative because it was not an act of authorship,
but merely a technique used to gain facts. 1 2 6 The court also
noted that Bellsouth's arrangement of facts was not sufficiently
creative to warrant copyright protection because its alphabetical
list of business types under normally used headings was essen-
tially typical.' 27
Following Feist, the U.S. appellate courts consistently
demonstrated that copyright protection given to databases is ex-
tremely limited.1 2' Even in cases where courts found a database
eligible for copyright protection, 129 or where copyright was con-
ceded by the defending party, the courts have nevertheless held
that wholesale copying of information does not rise to the level
of infringement. 30 In the post-Feist era, it is increasingly difficult
125. See id. at 1441 (holding that selecting listings through subscriber list does not
display requisite originality for copyright protection).
126. See id. (stating "[t]he protection of copyright must inhere in a creatively origi-
nal selection of facts to be reported and not in the creative means used to discover
those facts").
127. See id. at 1442 (reversing district court's ruling, stating that even though de-
fendant took qualitatively substantial amount of material, defendant did not appropri-
ate any original elements from plaintiff's directory); but see U.S. Payphone, Inc. v. Exec-
utives Unlimited of Durham, Inc., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 7599, 8 (4th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that defendants infringed copyright of reference guidebook, by copying
guidebook's state tariff section verbatim because "the organization of the state tariff
material was sufficiently subjective and original to make the Tariff Section copyright-
able material and that therefore, [defendant's] inadvertent copying constituted in-
fringement").
128. See Boyarski, supra note 71, at 903-04 (discussing how decision in Feist created
lack of incentives for collectors of information); Mitchell, supra note 17, at 908 (arguing
that proving sufficiency of selection and arrangement in databases is increasingly diffi-
cult after Feist).
129. See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 710 (2d. Cir. 1991) (holding that
although Kregos' pitching form was likely sufficient in its selection and arrangement to
be original and to be granted copyright, AP did not infringe Kregos' copyright).
Kregos obtained a copyright by the creativity he displayed in the selection of his statis-
tics. Id. If another party is able to display the requisite creativity that differs in more
than a trivial degree, there is no infringement. Id.; Key Publ'n, Inc. v. Chinatown Today
Publ'g Enter., 945 F.2d 509, 513 (holding while plaintiff had valid copyright, defen-
dant's use of information contained in database did not infringe plaintiff's copyright).
130. See Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 999 F.2d
1436, 1441 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that even though both parties conceded Bellsouth
had copyright in directory as whole, plaintiff's selection of facts was not sufficiently
creative). The Court held that even though the amount of material taken from the
plaintiff was qualitatively substantial, the defendant did not infringe on the original
elements of plaintiff's directory. Id. at 1442; Warren Publ'g Inc. v. Microdos Data
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to prevent a competitor from taking substantial amounts of fac-
tual material from copyrighted collections of information and
using it in a competing product.
1 3 1
2. The Attempted Legislative Protection: Collections Of
Information Anti-Piracy Act
On January 19, 1999, Chairman Coble 132 of the U.S. House
of Representatives introduced H.R. 354, which would amend the
Copyright Act of 1976 by adding a new chapter.133 The U.S. gov-
ernment expressed that the professed goal of H.R. 354 was to
stop the actual or threatened market injury resulting from the
misappropriation of substantial parts of collections of informa-
tion. H.R. 354 had seventy-six co-sponsors, including power-
ful senior representatives like John Conyers 3 5 (D-MI) and
Henry Hyde (R-IL).136 H.R. 354 protects databases by prohibit-
Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1520 (11 th Cir. 1997) (holding plaintiff's directory was copyright-
able but selection and arrangement were not sufficient to constitute infringement by
defendant). The Warren court further held that there was no copyright infringement
because the defendant did not copy any of the plaintiff's copyrightable material. Id. at
1520-21; see also Mitchell, supra note 17, at 908 (discussing negative impact of Feist on
database producers and articulating need for database legislation in United States).
131. See Boyarski, supra note 71, at 903-04 (concluding that since courts have gen-
erally found substantial takings from copyrightable compilations to be permissible,
database producers are unable to gain relief for damage to their investments).
132. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Howard Coble, at http://
bioguide.Congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=c000556 (reporting that Represen-
tative Howard Coble was elected as Republican to 99th and to eight succeeding Con-
gresses from January 3, 1985 to January 3, 2003); Jeff Trandahl, Official Alphabetical List
of the House of Representatives of the United States, 107th Congress, available at http://
clerkweb.house.gov/mbremtee/members/housemem.htm (stating that Congressman
Coble represents 6th District of North Carolina). Congressman Coble is a member of
the Judiciary Committee and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. Id.
133. See H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 2 (providing "Title 17, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following new chapter: Chapter 14-Misappropria-
tion of Collections of Information"); see also Karnell, supra note 81, at 3 (noting that
H.R. 354 would add additional chapter to Title 17 of U.S. Copyright Act).
134. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-349, pt. 1, at 11 (1999) [hereinafter H.R. 354 House
Report] (articulating goal of H.R. 354). H.R. 354 is designed to stimulate creation of
more collections of information and to encourage more competition between them,
without creating either monopoly or proprietary right to facts within the collection. Id.
135. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, John Conyers, at http://
bioguide.Congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=c00714 (reporting that Represen-
tative John Conyers, Jr. was elected as Democrat to 89th and to eighteen succeeding
Congresses from January 3, 1965 toJanuary 3, 2003); Trandahl, supra note 132 (stating
Congressman Conyers represents 14th District of Michigan). Congressman Conyers is a
member of the Judiciary Committee. Id.
136. See H.R. 354, supra note 17 (giving list of all sponsors and co-sponsors); see also
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ing uses and extractions of information contained in qualifying
databases that cause harm to either the primary or related mar-
ket of the database owner.137
a. H.R. 354 Section 1402: Proscription
Against Misappropriation
Under section 1402 of H.R. 354, a misappropriation could
occur from an unauthorized extraction or use in commerce of
any substantial part of a database.' Misappropriation can be
measured either quantitatively or qualitatively to determine
whether the extraction .of information caused harm to the actual
or potential market of the database creator. 13 9 Using both a
qualitative and quantitative analysis, a misappropriation could
occur where a person takes a relatively small portion of the infor-
mation contained in a database, if that information is fundamen-
tal to the database's value. 14  Similarly, a misappropriation
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Henry Hyde, at http://bioguide.Con-
gress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=h001022 (reporting that Representative Henry
John Hyde was elected as Republican to 94th Congress and to thirteen succeeding Con-
gresses fromJanuary 3, 1975 toJanuary 3, 2003); Trandahl, supra note 132 (stating that
Congressman Hyde represents 6th District of Illinois). Congressman Hyde is the Chair-
man of the International Relations Committee and is a member of the Judiciary Com-
mittee. Id.
137. See H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1402 (setting out central prohibition of H.R.
354). Section 1402 states:
Any person who extracts, or uses in commerce, all or a substantial part, mea-
sured either quantitatively or qualitatively, of a collection of information gath-
ered, organized, or maintained by another person through the investment of
substantial monetary or other resources, so as to cause harm to the actual or
potential market of that other person, or a successor in interest of that person,
for a product or service that incorporates that collection of information and is
offered or intended to be offered for sale or otherwise in commerce by that
person, or a successor in interest of that person, shall be liable to that person
or successor in interest for the remedies set forth in section 1406.
Id.
138. H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1402.
139. See id (noting measure to determine misappropriation); see also Mitchell,
supra note 17, at 911 (asserting that section 1402 aims to prohibit uses and extractions
of information that cause harm to either primary or related market of database owner).
140. H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1402; see Mitchell, supra note 17, at 911 (explaining
that misappropriation of substantial part of database is not directly correlated with
quantitative amount of information pirated); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied
Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on
Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119, 1177 n.405 (2000) (remarking that H.R. 354 clari-
fies that quantitative measures refer to repeated extraction of individual pieces of data).
Qualitative measures could be actionable even though they may be small in relation to
the whole database. Id.
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could transpire if a person copied a major portion of the infor-
mation contained in a database, regardless of the information's
importance.
1 4 1
To qualify for protection under section 1402, the informa-
tion contained in the database must be gathered, organized, or
maintained through the investment of substantial resources. 142
H.R. 354 protects any substantial investment, whether it is
money, time, or effort. 143 Experts explain that this provision
seeks to revise the "sweat of the brow" doctrine that was histori-
cally used to prevent copying database information when that
information was created through considerable effort. 144
b. H.R. 354 Section 1403: Exceptions to the General
Prohibition Against Misappropriation
Section 1403 of H.R. 354 provides a list of acts that are per-
mitted uses or extractions of data despite the broad prohibitions
of section 1402.145 Section 1403 permits the extraction or use of
141. H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1402; see Mitchell, supra note 17, at 911 (cautioning
that definition of substantial part can include large extractions of information that are
of little importance to database owner).
142. See H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1402 (referring to both monetary and non-
monetary resources).
143. See id. (providing for protection of "the investment of substantial monetary or
other resources").
144. See Antipiracy Hearings, supra note 11 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Regis-
ter of Copyrights); see also Mitchell, supra note 17, at 911 (arguing that section 1402
seeks to revive "sweat of the brow" doctrine to prevent copying of information created
through substantial investment).
145. See H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1403 (defining permitted uses or extractions of
data). Section 1403 provides in pertinent part:
Permitted acts
(a) Educational, Scientific, Research, and Additional Reasonable Uses.
(1) Certain nonprofit educational, scientific, or research uses. Notwith-
standing section 1402, no person shall be restricted from extracting
or using information for nonprofit educational, scientific, or research
purposes in a manner that does not harm directly the actual market
for the product or service referred to in section 1402.
(2) Additional Reasonable Uses.
(A) In General. Notwithstanding section 1402, an individual act of
use or extraction of information done for the purpose of illustra-
tion, explanation, example, comment, criticism, teaching, re-
search, or analysis, in an amount appropriate or customary for
that purpose, is not a violation of this chapter, if it is reasonable
under the circumstances. In determining whether such an act is
reasonable under the circumstances, the following factors shall
he considered:
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information contained in databases by certain nonprofit, educa-
tional, scientific, and research communities in specific situa-
tions. 4 6 This exception to the prohibitions of section 1402 al-
lows extraction or use of information by these groups if it does
not significantly harm the primary market for the product or ser-
vice protected in section 1402.147 At least one expert comments
that this exception expressly limits liability for a misappropria-
tion 148 by one of these groups to when their extraction or use of
information causes direct harm to the primary market of the
database. 149
(i) The extent to which the use or extraction is commercial or
nonprofit.
(ii) The good faith of the person making the use or extraction.
(iii) The extent to which and the manner in which the portion
used or extracted is incorporated into an independent work
or collection, and the degree of difference between the col-
lection from which the use or extraction is made and the
independent work or collection.
(iv) Whether the collection from which the use or extraction is
made is primarily developed for or marketed to persons en-
gaged in the same field or business as the person making
the use or extraction.
In no case shall a use or extraction be permitted under this
paragraph if the used or extracted portion is offered or in-
tended to be offered for sale or otherwise in commerce and
is likely to serve as a market substitute for all or part of the
collection from which the use or extraction is made.
Id.; see also Mitchell, supra note 17, at 912 (explaining that while broad language is used
in section 1402, section 1403 still provides list of allowable acts).
146. See Carol Noonan &Jeffery Raskin, Intellectual Property Crimes, 38 AM. CiUM. L.
REv. 971, 1000 (2001) (explaining H.R. 354 provides fair use protection for educa-
tional, research, and scientific uses); see also Martin, supra note 37, at 159 (commenting
that Database Directive provides notable exception for Member States to allow signifi-
cant unauthorized use of database for private, non-commercial purposes). Similar to
H.R. 354, the Database Directive permits the unauthorized use of a database for illustra-
tion in teaching or research. Id. An exception is also provided in furtherance of public
security or administrative or judicial procedures. Id.
147. H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1403; see Mitchell, supra note 17, at 912 (noting
that these groups will only be legally responsible for misappropriation if their extrac-
tion or use of information causes direct injury to principal market of database).
148. See Hansen, supra note 76, at 302 (observing that while H.R. 354 is catego-
rized as "misappropriation bill," in reality, it grants sui generis right). If the bill was truly
a misappropriation bill, it would be appropriate to merely say "misappropriation law
applies." Id. Here, H.R. 354 gives definitions, rights, and remedies. Id. This is the
same treatment a sui generis law would give. Id.
149. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 911 (concluding that nonprofit scientific, li-
brary, or educational user will not be liable for use or extraction that only indirectly
harms primary market or harms only related market).
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Section 1403 also has a "reasonable use" provision that pro-
vides protection for certain individual acts of misappropria-
tion."0 Subsection 1403(a) provides a possible defense to cer-
tain nonprofit, educational, scientific, or research users as long
as their use does not directly harm the actual market for the
product or service.1"1 The exception takes into account the
good faith of the person making the use or extraction and the
extent to which the portion used or extracted is incorporated
into an independent work. 152 Finally, section 1403 considers the
degree of difference between the collection from which the ex-
traction is made and the independent work.153
150. H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1403(a) (2); see Martin, supra note 37, at 159 (indi-
cating that permission is not required for nonprofit or educational use of database).
Permission is required when making a temporary or permanent reproduction of a copy-
righted database, translation, adaptation, arrangement, and any other alteration of a
copyrighted database. Id.
151. See Antipiracy Hearings, supra note 11, at 4-5 (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights). Peters stated:
As initially drafted, the exception for nonprofit educational, scientific or re-
search uses served a primarily symbolic value. While its inclusion in the bill
constituted a legislative recognition of the value and importance of such uses,
the exception was written in such a way as to simply restate in the affirmative
that such uses were permitted as long as they did not cause market harm
(which would not in any event have violated the prohibition). When H.R. 2652
was incorporated into H.R. 2281, this exception (now § 1403(a)(1)) was
broadened to permit such uses as long as they did not directly harm the actual
market-thus ruling out liability for indirect harm, or harm to a potential
market.
The Copyright Office supports this change. In our view, it appropriately
limits liability for nonprofit public interest uses to the only situations where
such uses pose a serious and immediate threat to the producer's investment-
i.e., where the user is a member of the market for which the database is pro-
duced, and utilizes it without permission or payment. While a producer may
need protection against a commercial competitor's preemption of a potential
market, such a broad field of application does not seem necessary for non-
profit scientists and scholars.
Id.
152. H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1403(A) (2)-(3); see Mitchell, supra note 17, at 912
(remarking that section 1403's reasonable use provision is similar to fair use provision
of section 107 of Copyright Act of 1976). Section 1403 extends protection for certain
individual acts or misappropriations as long as they are reasonable under the circum-
stances. Id.
153. H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1403(A)(4); see Mitchell, supra note 17, at 912
(maintaining that section 1403 provides exception for extractions of data that are in-
substantial in nature).
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c. H.R. 354 Section 1404: Exclusions for Government
Collections and Computer Programs
Section 1404 of H.R. 354 rejects protection for federal,
state, and local government databases, regardless of whether the
database was produced by an employee or agent of the govern-
ment or whether it was produced under an exclusive govern-
ment license.' 54 Section 1404, however, does allow protection
for databases produced by a government agent or licensee while
not acting within the scope of his or her employment. 155 Section
1404 also allows protection for any federal or state educational
institutions that create databases in the course of education or
scholarship.1
56
Section 1404(b) rules out protection for computer pro-
grams. 57 This section explains that while there is often a close
relationship between a computer program and a database, com-
puter programs are not protected under this Act. 15' Notwith-
standing this limitation, section 1404 mandates that a database is
not ineligible for protection solely by virtue of its inclusion
154. See H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1404(a)(1) (stating that protection does not
apply to databases compiled by government). Subsection 1404(a) states in pertinent
part:
(1) Exclusion. Protection under this chapter shall not extend to collections
of information gathered, organized, or maintained by or for a govern-
ment entity, whether Federal, State, or local, including any employee or
agent of such entity, or any person exclusively licensed by such entity,
within the scope of the employment, agency, or license. Nothing in this
subsection shall preclude protection under this chapter for information
gathered, organized or maintained by such an agent or licensee that is not
within the scope of such agency or license, or by a Federal or State educa-
tional institution in the course of engaging in education or scholarship.
(2) Exception-The exclusion under paragraph (1) does not apply to any in-




157. See H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1404(B). Section 1404(B) provides in pertinent
part:
[P]rotection under this chapter shall not extend to computer programs, in-
cluding, but not limited to, any computer program used in the manufacture,
production, operation, or maintenance of a collection of information, or any
element of a computer program necessary to its operation.
Id.
158. Id.; see Mitchell, supra note 17, at 913 (noting that protection does not ex-
tend to programs that are used in manufacture, production, operation, or maintenance
of database, or that address, route, forward, transmit, or store, provide, or retrieve ac-
cess to connections for digital online communications).
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within a computer program.159
d. H.R. 354 Section 1405: The Act's Relationship To
Other Laws
Section 1405 of H.R. 354 specifically articulates that the Act
does not affect any rights, limitations, or remedies with respect
to copyright law.' 6 ' The section also has no effect on other fed-
eral laws, including antitrust, patent, trademark, and contract
law.'6 1 Finally, section 1405(b) preempts any state law that pro-
vides databases with rights that are equivalent to the prohibitions
against misappropriation provided in section 1402 of the Act. 16 2
e. H.R. 354 Section 1406 & 1407: Civil and
Criminal Remedies
Section 1406 addresses the civil remedies that are available
to a database producer under H.R. 354. 163 Under H.R. 354, any
person who is injured by a violation of section 1402 can bring
suit in any appropriate federal court. 6 4 This section provides
for both temporary and permanent injunctions, impoundment
of all copies of contents of a misappropriated database, and
monetary relief.165 Section 1407 mandates substantial criminal
159. See H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1404(B)(2) (stating that "[a] collection of infor-
mation that is otherwise subject to protection under this chapter is not disqualified
from such protection solely because it is incorporated into a computer program").
160. See H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1405(a) (stating that "nothing in this chapter
shall affect rights, limitations, or remedies concerning copyright"); see also Mitchell,
supra note 17, at 913 (confirming that scope of copyright protection for databases or
for works of authorship contained in database will not change).
161. See H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1405(f)-(g) (articulating that Act also has no
effect on Communications Act of 1934 or Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
162. See H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1405(b) (explaining further that state law with
respect to trademark, design rights, antitrust, trade secrets, privacy, access to public
documents, and contracts are not deemed to provide rights equivalent to section 1402).
163. See id. § 1406 (providing civil remedies for misappropriations to any person
who is injured by section 1402, Prohibition Against Misappropriation).
164. See id. § 1406(a) (providing federal jurisdiction unless action is against state
governmental entity, in which case, case may be brought in any court of proper jurisdic-
tion).
165. See id. § 1406(e)-(h) (providing options for enforcement of civil misappropri-
ations). Subsection 1406(e) protects certain nonprofit communities by instructing a
court to reduce or remit any monetary relief entirely in cases where the defendant is an
employee or agent of a nonprofit educational, scientific, library, or research institution
and the defendant believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his conduct
was permissible under the Act. Id. § 1406(e). Subsection (f) states that an injunction
or impoundment shall not apply to any action against the United States Government.
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fines and imprisonment if any person willfully violates section
1402.166 Additionally, section 1407 sanctions direct or indirect
commercial advantage or financial gain that causes a total loss or
damage to the database provider of more than U.S.$100,000 in
any one year period.16
7
f. H.R. 354 Sections 1408 and 1409: Limitations on Actions
and Defenses to Claims
Sections 1408 and 1409 of H.R. 354 provide that the statute
of limitations for both civil and criminal matters under this Act is
three years from the time the cause of action arises or the claim
accrues. 6 ' Sections 1408 and 1409 also seeks to limit the protec-
tion provided to the information contained in the subject
database to fifteen years from the time the information is first
put into the stream of commerce.169 Section 1408 seeks to elimi-
Id. § 1406(f). Subsection (g) permits remedies in this section to be enforced against a
state governmental entity. Id. § 1406(g). Finally, subsection (h) denies any relief under
this section to Internet service providers unless the provider willfully violates section
1402. Id. § 1406(h).
166. See id. § 1407(a) (2) (excluding employees or agents of nonprofit educational,
scientific, or research institutions, libraries, or archives, if agent or employee was acting
within scope of his or her employment).
167. Id. § 1407(a) (1) (A)-(C).
168. See id. § 1408-09 (asserting statutes of limitations for civil and criminal acts).
Section 1409 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Criminal Proceedings. No criminal proceeding shall be maintained
under this chapter unless it is commenced within three years after the
cause of action arises.
(b) Civil Actions. No civil action shall be maintained under this chapter un-
less it is commenced within three years after the cause of action arises or
claim accrues.
Id.
169. See id. § 1408(c) (defining statute of limitations on misappropriation claims).
Subsection 1408(a) provides:
Additional Limitation. No criminal or civil action shall be maintained under
this chapter for the extraction or use of all or a substantial part of a collection
of information that occurs more than 15 years after the portion of the collec-
tion that is extracted or used was first offered for sale or otherwise in com-
merce, following the investment of resources that qualified that portion of the
collection for protection under this chapter. In no case shall any protection
under this chapter resulting from a substantial investment of resources in
maintaining a preexisting collection prevent any use or extraction of informa-
tion from a copy of the preexisting collection after the 15 years have expired
with respect to the portion of that preexisting collection that is so used or
extracted and no liability under this chapter shall thereafter attach to such
acts of use or extraction.
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nate the possibility of perpetual protection of databases by ex-
cluding from protection the effort put into maintaining a preex-
isting database.17 °
II. GETTING WHAT YOU GIVE: EVALUATING U.S. EFFORTS
TO MEET THE COMPARABLE
PROTECTION STANDARD
The EU Database Directive requires comparable protection
from non-Member States in order to receive reciprocal database
protection. 71 Comparable protection serves two functions. 7 2
First, the reciprocity provision gives the EU an advantage in bi-
lateral negotiations with its trading partners. 173 Second, the reci-
procity provision encourages database production within the
borders of the EU. 1 7 4
To date, no country has applied to the Commission for re-
ciprocal protection. 175  Commentators note that while the
United States has not formally applied for comparable protec-
170. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 914 (discussing how H.R. 354 aims to avoid
problems associated with perpetual protection); Antipiracy Hearings, supra note 11, at
7 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (remarking that efforts to
maintain preexisting database by updating its content will not extend fifteen year pro-
tection period of protection for that preexisting database). Efforts to maintain a preex-
isting database will only provide protection for the new updated version. Id.
171. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 11, recital 56 (providing non-Mem-
ber States will only be afforded rights granted in Directive if they offer comparable
protection to databases produced by nationals of EU Member States).
172. See Powell, supra note 73, at 124546 (noting that EU kept reciprocity provi-
sion in Database Directive because it is useful bargaining chip in negotiations with non-
EU nations); Bastian supra note 57, at 456 (asserting that current EU approach is not
one of harmonization, but rather use of legal system as bargaining tool to obtain
favorable trade relationships).
173. See Powell, supra note 73, at 124546 (explaining reluctance of EU to replace
reciprocity with national treatment).
174. Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 11(1)-(2). See Hunsucker, supra note
40, at 730 (detailing how entities seeking sui generis right must have been formed in
compliance with law of Member State and have their registered office, central adminis-
tration, or principal place of business within Community). A company that has only a
registered office in the Community must have business operations linked on a continu-
ing basis with the economy of a Member State. Id.; John Tessensohn, The Devil's in the
Details: The Quest for Legal Protection of Computer Databases and the Collections of Information
Act, H.R. 2652, 38 IDEA 439, 465-66 (1999) (commenting that large producers of
databases may be able to avoid harm of not receiving protection under Database Direc-
tive by setting up commercial establishments within EU, but smaller producers may not
be able to afford this option).
175. See Hansen, supra note 76, at 301-03 (arguing that while Commission has ulti-
mate power over whether non-Member States receive comparable protection, no coun-
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tion, if passed, H.R. 354 or a similar act would trigger the reci-
procity provision. 176 Other commentators argue, however, that
the Database Directive and H.R. 354 are disparately dissimilar
and thus H.R. 354 would not provide comparable protection. 177
A. Reciprocal Protection: Arguing the Sufficiency of H.R. 354
Many commentators argued in favor of granting reciprocal
protection to U.S. database makers upon the passage of H.R.
354.178 This position conflicts directly with that of other com-
mentators who argue that the types of protection granted in the
Database Directive and H.R. 354 are so dissimilar that the U.S.
Act does not provide comparable protection.1 79 Commentators
try has applied to EU for reciprocal protection). As a result, the comparable protection
standard has yet to be quantified in practical terms. Id.
176. See Jonathan Band & Makoto Kono, The Database Protection Debate in the 106th
Congress, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 869, 872 (2001) (suggesting goal of H.R. 354 was to protect
investment in databases by restoring "sweat of the brow" doctrine and enacting bill that
provides comparable protection); Freno, supra note 7, at 225 (concluding that H.R. 354
would likely secure reciprocal international protection under EU Database Directive);
Ritter et. al., supra note 32, at 141 n.50 (arguing H.R. 354 is comparable in scope to
Database Directive).
177. See Mark J. Davison, Proposed U.S. Database Legislation: A Comparison with the
UK. Database Regulations, [1999] EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 279, 282-84 (opining that
there are distinct and significant differences in rights and liabilities, permitted uses,
relationship to contract, compulsory licenses, and duration of protection between H.R.
354 and UK Regulation implementing EU Database Directive); Amanda Perkins, United
States Still No Closer to Database Legislation, [2000] EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 366, 369 (as-
serting that because H.R. 354 does not grant full property right to database producers it
does not provide comparable protection).
178. See Freno, supra note 7, at 225 (acknowledging that sui generis right under
H.R. 354 would most likely secure comparable protection under EU Database Direc-
tive); Hansen, supra note 76, at 302 (expressing that misappropriation in H.R. 354 is
identical to sui generis protection in Database Directive and therefore meets EU's reci-
procity requirement); Sullivan, supra note 80, at 365 (naming supporters of granting
comparable protection under H.R. 354). Supporters included the Software and Infor-
mation Industry Association, a trade group that includes 1400 companies including Mc-
Graw-Hill Companies and Reed-Elseveier, Inc. Id. at 365 n.232. Supporters of H.R. 354
also included the National Association of Realtors, the Register of Copyrights, the
American Bar Association, the American Intellectual Property Law Association, and the
securities and commodities markets. Id. at 365. These groups support H.R. 354 be-
cause the current disparity in the legal protection of databases leaves U.S. databases
vulnerable to misappropriation. Id.; but see Band & Kono, supra note 176, at 869(advo-
cating for ignoring comparable protection standard in EU Database Directive and hav-
ing United States independently decide what level of protection is appropriate for
databases because substantive merits of comparability are insignificant factor in political
process).
179. See Davison, supra note 177, at 282 n.32 (commenting that United Kingdom
Regulations implementing Database Directive confer exclusive right of extraction and
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who argue in favor of granting reciprocal protection to the U.S.
maintain that the Database Directive requires only that non-
Member States provide "comparable protection," and argue that
under the doctrine of comparable protection it is possible for
nations to use different terms to elicit the same level of protec-
tion. 0
1. Legislative Intent
H.R. 354 was a direct response to the Database Directive.18
Scholars opine that the act was drafted with an express intent to
provide comparable protection. 8 2 The U.S. House Report dis-
cussing H.R. 354 notes that the EU's Database Directive creates a
sui generis right but denies this protection to collections of infor-
mation originating in non-Member State countries unless that
country offers "comparable protection" to collections produced
in the EU.'8 3 According to the U.S. House of Representatives,
when the Database Directive is fully implemented, U.S. firms
could be placed at a significant competitive disadvantage in the
European market."8 4 While H.R. 354 rejects the idea that an ex-
re-utilization). Re-utilization is broader than the American term "commercial use" be-
cause re-utilization includes "any making available to the public" and cannot be re-
stricted to commercial activity. Id.; see also Perkins, supra note 177, at 367-72 (compar-
ing and contrasting Database Directive with H.R. 354 and concluding that protection
granted in each is very different).
180. See Hansen, supra note 76, at 302-03 (arguing that protection against misap-
propriation in H.R. 354 is comparable to sui generis protection in Database Directive
regardless of the difference in names); Sullivan, supra note 80, at 356-58 (surmising that
protection against misappropriation given in H.R. 354 is comparable to sui generis pro-
tection in Database Directive).
181. See H.R. 354 House Report, supra note 134, at 11 (explaining how Database
Directive requires comparable protection). Unless the United States passes a bill that
meets with the Database Directive's comparable protection standards, U.S. database
producers will be put at enormous competitive disadvantage. Id.
182. See id. at 10 (explaining how recent legal developments have threatened to
slow U.S. database production by eliminating incentives for investment).
183. See id. at 10-11 (commenting on possible harmful effects of Database Directive
on U.S. database producers). The House Report provides in pertinent part:
Among other things, the Directive creates a new sui generis right form of prop-
erty right for the legal protection of databases to supplement copyright. How-
ever, it denies this new protection to collections of information originating in
the United States or other countries unless the other country offers "compara-
ble" protection to collections originating in the European Union. When fully
implemented, the European Directive could place U.S. firms at an enormous
competitive disadvantage throughout the entire European market.
Id.,
184. See id. at 11 (explaining further that at WIPO, discussions are being held to
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clusive sui generis property right is the only means to provide
strong database protection, it offers comparable protection
through the implementation of a copyright-related federal mis-
appropriation statute. 85
2. Sui Generis and Misappropriation: Different Names,
Similar Protection
Commentators agree that both the Database Directive and
H.R. 354 are a response to the decision in Feist v. Rural Telephone
Service.'86 At least one scholar notes that while the Database Di-
rective refers to its protection as "sui generis" and H.R. 354 refers
to its protection as "misappropriation," both confer the same
right to database makers.'8 7 Legal experts assert that there is
nothing that would be allowed under the misappropriation bill
that would not be allowed under the Database Directive's sui
generis protection.8 8 Legal experts also note that the European
Commission is silent on the issue of U.S. reciprocity, possibly in-
tending to lead the U.S. Congress into assuming that H.R. 354 or
a similar law would meet the reciprocity requirement.
89
determine whether international treaty granting sui generis property rights should be
supported).
185. See id. (announcing that preventing producers from having to rely on various
individual State laws is essential to success of U.S. database market).
186. See id. at 10 (emphasizing that Supreme Court in Feist established only mini-
mal protection for commercially significant databases and legislation was needed to
provide stronger protection); John N. Adams, The Reporting Exception: Does It Still Exist ?,
[1999] EUR. INTELL. PROP. Rv. 383, 383 (stating that in drafting Article 3 of Database
Directive, the Commission appears to have had Feist decision in mind); Hansen, supra
note 76, at 277 (commenting that history of database regulation in Europe can be
traced back to United States). In 1991,Jean Francois Verstrynge was teaching at Ford-
ham University School of Law in the European Community Center. Id. Verstrynge was
the head of copyright in the Commission of the EU. Id. While at Fordham, Verstrynge
read the Feist decision. Id. Upon reading the decision, Verstrynge reportedly remarked
"[u]h-oh, we've got to change our directive". Id. Thus, the Directive includes a sui
generis law rather than just a copyright law. Id.
187. See Hansen, supra note 76, at 302-03 (arguing differences in terms does not
affect similarities between H.R. 354 and Database Directive).
188. See id. (calling rights granted in H.R. 354 "a sui generis right in misappropria-
tion clothing"); Freno, supra note 7, at 225 (arguing H.R. 354 would have secured recip-
rocal protection for U.S. databases in EU).
189. See Hansen, supra note 76, at 303 (suggesting EU is not officially commenting
on issue of U.S. reciprocity because EU wants U.S. database bill). The EU wants the
United States to pass a bill that meets with the .comparable protection standard so the
United States and the EU can jointly lobby WIPO for worldwide database protection
treaty. Id.; Band & Kono, supra note 176, at 877-78 (commenting that database debate
and discussion of reciprocal protection is more robust in United States than in EU).
2002] LEGISLATING THE GOLDEN RULE 1029
Even opponents of H.R. 354 recognize that the act provides
comparable protection under the EU Database Directive. 9 ' The
sui generis provisions of the Database Directive protect the con-
tents of any non-copyrightable database that is the product of
substantial investment.1 9' The Member States must permit ex-
traction or use of an insubstantial part of a protected
database. 192 Commentators assert that H.R. 354 uses different
language to accomplish essentially the same result.' 93 H.R. 354
protects against use or extraction in commerce of all or a sub-
stantial part of a protected collection of information that is the
result of substantial investment.
94
B. Reciprocal Protection: Arguing the Insufficiency of H.R. 354
While some commentators argue that H.R. 354 should trig-
ger reciprocal protection for U.S. databases under the Database
Directive, other commentators suggest the United States needs
to pass a bill with more complete database protection in order to
secure reciprocal protection under the Database Directive."'
According to opponents of granting the United States reciprocal
protection, the provisions of H.R. 354 are too weak to be compa-
rable to sui generis protection.1 96 In practice, commentators on
190. See Freno, supra note 7, at 199-205 (commenting that while sui gneris protec-
tion is necessary for United States to avoid economic isolation, and H.R. 354 provides
sui generis protection under Database Directive, H.R. 354 is still defective because it
offers too much protection to U.S. database makers); see also Reichman & Uhlir, supra
note 62, at 803-04 (opining that sui generis model is unbalanced and H.R. 354 created
U.S. version of that defective model).
191. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 7(1) (articulating when Member
States are required to provide protection for database producer):
192. See id. art. 8(1) (providing rights and obligations of lawful users).
193. See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 62, at 804 (stating that H.R. 354 was new
version of H.R. 2281 with same basic result as Database Directive); Freno, supra note 7,
at 224 (opining that H.R. 354 would be sufficient to secure reciprocal protection under
Database Directive).
194. See H.R. 354, supra note 17, § 1402.
195. See Perkins, supra note 177, at 367 (noting Database Directive was impetus for
United States to pass database legislation, but bills were hastily introduced and inade-
quate).
196. See Davison, supra note 177, at 284 (arguing protection afforded by H.R. 354
is insufficient to qualify for comparable protection under Database Directive). While
the United States grants broad statutory rights in H.R. 354 with a long period of protec-
tion, this has less effect than the Database Directive. Id. The operation of H.R. 354 is
too easily limited by broad exceptions which may override contractual license. Id. In
order to provide comparable protection, the United States must grant narrow rights for
database producers that can be augmented by strict contractual conditions. Id. This
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both sides of the comparable protection debate argue that the
same database may receive different protection in Europe and
the United States if H.R. 354 is enacted.197
1. Comparison with the United Kingdom
Implementing Regulation
The Database Directive takes precedence over Member
State national law.198 Member State governments are required
to implement the Database Directive fully and completely.1 99 In
August 1997, the Copyright Directorate of the United Kingdom
Patent Office issued Draft Regulations ("UK Regulation") which
implemented the Database Directive.20 The UK Regulation is
exemplary of how to implement the Database Directive.2" Many
would give database makers an advantage even in light of exceptions to these rights and
a relatively short period of protection. Id.
197. See Perkins, supra note 177, at 372 (noting lack of consensus regarding inter-
national database protection). H.R. 354 and the Database Directive were largely shaped
by opposing interest groups. Id. This leaves little common ground to compromise on
major issues like the scope of liability and permitted exceptions. Id.
198. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 16 (providing final provisions). Ar-
ticle 16 provides in pertinent part:
Final provisions
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administra-
tive provisions necessary to comply with this Directive before 1 January
1998.
When Member States adopt these provisions, they shall contain a reference
to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion
of their official publication. The methods of making such reference shall
be laid down by Member States.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the provi-
sions of domestic law which they adopt in the field governed by this Direc-
tive.
Id.; see also Chalton, supra note 60, at 278 (asserting that Database Directive is fully
binding on United Kingdom and all Member States).
199. See Database Directive, supra note 13, art. 16(1) (providing Member States
must enact Database Directive before January 1, 1998).
200. See Statutory Instrument 1997 No. 3032, Copyright and Rights in Databases
Regulations 1997, entered into force January 1, 1998, implementing Database Directive
[hereinafter UK Regulation]; see also Stanley Lai, Database Protection in the United King-
dom: The New Deal and its Effects on Software Protection, [ 1998] EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 32,
32 (discussing effect of Database Directive on United Kingdom). The UK Regulation is
constrained by the requirement of standardization and the implementation of uniform
provisions rather than a minimum standard of protection. Id.
201. See Davison, supra note 177, at 282 (using UK Regulation as example of how
Database Directive should be implemented by Member States); Perkins, supra note 177,
at 366 (using UK Regulation as point of comparison for Member State implementation
of Database Directive).
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commentators use the UK Regulation as a point of comparison
between H.R. 354 and the Database Directive because the
United Kingdom is the only Member State to have case law aris-
ing from its legislation implementing the Database Directive.2 °2
While commentators against granting the United States rec-
iprocity under H.R. 354 concede that there is a significant over-
lap between the definitions of collections of information and
databases, they argue that the rights granted under these defini-
tions vary significantly. 20 1 Unlike the UK Regulation, which ex-
pressly provides the database maker with a full property right,
H.R. 354 uses unfair competition as a basis for protecting the
database maker's interests.20 4 Proponents of denying the United
States reciprocity under H.R. 354 argue that the rights granted
under these definitions are distinct from one another.20 5
Opponents of granting the United States comparable pro-
tection under H.R. 354 note that H.R. 354 and the UK Regula-
tions offer different provisions dealing with the duration of pro-
202. See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 177 (comparing H.R. 354 with the Statutory In-
strument 1997 No. 3032 ("UK Regulation")); see also British Horseracing Board Ltd. v.
William Hill Organisation Ltd., [2001] EWCA Civ. 1268 (2001) (UK) (noting that case
is first to deal with issue of database rights).
203. See Simon Chalton, The Copyright and Rights in Database Regulations 1997: Some
Outstanding Issues on Implementation of the Database Directive, [1998] EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 178, 179 (discussing United Kingdom's definition of database and database rights
under Database Directive). Whether a collection qualifies as a database may depend on
the quality of independence between its component elements. Id. The collection must
also be arranged in a systematic or methodical way. Id. Finally, each item must be
individually accessible. Id.
204. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"); see also Perkins, supra note 177, at
367-68 (opining that United States does not grant full property rights to facts and ideas
because it would be fraught with constitutional difficulty). The intellectual property
clause in the U.S. Constitution does not allow a property right to be created in facts and
ideas without violating the First Amendment right to free speech. Id.
205. See Davison, supra note 177, at 282 (comparing H.R. 354 with UK Regulations
implementing Database Directive). H.R. 354 prohibits extraction or use in commerce
of a substantial part only when doing so causes harm to the actual or potential market
of the collection owner. Id. In contrast, the UK regulations are more clear cut and give
greater protection to databases. Id. They do not allow any extraction or re-utilization
of a substantial part of the database regardless of the consequences, unless the extrac-
tion or re-utilization comes within the limited exceptions provided for in the regula-
tions. Id. Under the UK regulations there is no need to demonstrate any harm to
either existing or potential markets. Id.
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tection. 2°6 H.R. 354 protects data for fifteen years after it is first
made commercially available. 21 7 Under the UK Regulations, the
fifteen year period is renewable for the entire database so long as
substantial investment is made in adding to or altering the
database.20 8 While these provisions are different in scope, even
opponents of reciprocity concede that H.R. 354's preservation of
contractual arrangement may have the same practical effect as
the UK Regulations' provisions dealing with the duration of pro-
tection.2 °9
2. Implications of the Broad Contractual Rights of H.R. 354
At least one opponent of granting reciprocal protection to
U.S. database makers reasons that there may be difficulties when
harmonizing international laws concerning databases. 2 10  Com-
mentators discuss that the broad statutory rights H.R. 354 grants
with extensive periods of protection are not as efficient at secur-
ing database protection as the rights granted by the UK Regula-
tions.2 11 They argue that the protection provided by H.R. 354 is
less effective because the rights granted by H.R. 354 can be nar-
rowed by broad exceptions which override contractual li-
206. See id. at 281-82 (noting that different time spans of protection between H.R.
354 and Database Directive create facially different rights and liabilities).
207. See id. at 281 (explaining that once that period of time has expired, data no
longer receives protection even though it may be part of collection of information that
has been updated).
208. See UK Regulation, supra note 200, § 17(3) (stating renewal period for
database protection); Davison, supra note 177, at 283 (noting database protection
under UK Regulation is restricted to 15 years after it is first made commercially availa-
ble).
209. See Simon Chalton, Database Right: Stronger Than It Looks, [2001] EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV 296, 297 (articulating that UK Regulation does not allow any contractual
provision contrary to lawful user rights provisions); Davison, supra note 177, at 283 (ex-
plaining how owner of collection of information can contractually restrict use and dis-
semination of information that has been commercially available for more than 15
years).
210. See Davison, supra note 177, at 284 (giving example of problem of providing
protection for various special interest groups, such as provision under H.R. 354 which
grants protection for securities and commodities market).
211. See id. at 282-83 (surmising that UK Regulation has more limited exceptions
than H.R. 354). Those exceptions, however, are of less practical relevance because the
exceptions to the UK Regulations cannot be overridden by contract. Id.; Perkins, supra
note 177, at 370 (noting that UK Regulations give database producers less opportunity
for circumventing permitted acts than under H.R. 354). H.R. 354 does not override the
freedom to contract. Id. As a result, contract can be used to override provisions of H.R.
354 but not in the U.K. Regulations, where contractual options are limited. Id.
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censes.212 Conversely, narrow rights can confer significant ad-
vantages when they are extended by strict contractual condi-
213tions.
Commentators who are opposed to granting the United
States reciprocal protection posit that these substantive issues
must be addressed and resolved before reciprocal protection can
be finalized.214 These commentators believe other nations must
be convinced of the overriding need for true sui generis database
protection.215 Until there is an unambiguous international
model for protection and a clearly definable objective in provid-
ing sui generis protection, critics of H.R. 354 will not support
granting the United States comparable protection for
databases.2 16
III. EXTENDING THE GOLDEN RULE ACROSS THE
ATLANTIC: SUGGESTIONS FOR ENSURING
COMPARABLE PROTECTION BETWEEN
THE EU AND THE
UNITED STATES
In the age of computers and expanding technology, the
212. See Perkins, supra note 177, at 370 (noting that because H.R. 354 does not
limit freedom to contract, contract could be used to override other exceptions provided
for in H.R. 354); Davison, supra note 177, at 282-83 (expressing concern that H.R. 354
allows contract to prevent extraction of unsubstantial amounts of data while UK Regula-
tion does not allow these rights to be prohibited or forbidden by agreement).
213. See Davison, supra note 177, at 283 (explaining that while these differences
may appear facially trivial, they could potentially provide disparately different rights
and liabilities).
214. See id. at 284 (arguing substantive differences between H.R. 354 and UK Reg-
ulations must be resolved before international treaty for database treaty can be en-
acted); Perkins, supra note 177, at 366 (opining that it will be long time before any
consensus is achieved on harmonizing database protection).
215. See Davison, supra note 177, at 284 (arguing international database protection
is necessary but unlikely at present time). Unless the United States and EU can enact
similar database laws, it will be difficult to convince the rest of the world that databases
need sui generis type protection. See Freno, supra note 7, at 224 (surmising international
database protection is necessary to fully protect U.S. investment in databases). The only
way to obtain broader international protection through treaties is to pass a law that
provides comparable protection to the Database Directive. Id.
216. See Davison, supra note 177, at 284 (claiming differences in protection must
be narrowed before negotiations for reciprocal protection under Database Directive or
more far-reaching international treaty can take place); Perkins, supra note 177, at 372
(noting that international negotiations on database protection have been slow with no
foreseeable end in sight).
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need for database protection laws is growing stronger.217 As ac-
cessibility to databases outside one's home country becomes eas-
ier, database makers need rights to reciprocal protection in
these nations.21a Following the Database Directive, the United
States realized a pressing need for sui generis database protec-
tion. 2 19 The United States will not be immune from State-sanc-
tioned piracy until mechanisms like H.R. 354 are enacted
through which EU database makers will be held accountable for
their conduct. 22° Thus, while there are slight recognizable dif-
ferences between H.R. 354 and the Database Directive, the simi-
larities between misappropriation and sui generis protection far
outweigh these differences.22 1
A. The Need for a U.S. Law That Meets the Comparable
Protection Standard
The sui generis protection provided under the Database Di-
rective is comparable to the protection against misappropriation
granted in H.R. 354.222 It logically follows that because the pro-
visions are comparable, the United States should be afforded re-
ciprocal protection for databases in the EU.2 23 If H.R. 354 is
passed, neither U.S. nor EU database makers will suffer a com-
petitive disadvantage in the other's market.224 By harmonizing
database laws and granting reciprocal protection to the United
States, the EU will help promote both the creation of new
databases and investment in the database industry. 225
217. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (providing background information
for why technology has increased need for database protection).
218. See supra notes 23-26 (explaining problem of database piracy and solutions to
curtail unauthorized copying of databases).
219. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text (discussing intent of drafters of
H.R. 354 to provide comparable protection under Database Directive so United States
would not be placed at comparative disadvantage).
220. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing how Database Directive
put U.S. database makers at comparative disadvantage).
221. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing how H.R. 354 is U.S.
version of sui generis right created by Database Directive).
222. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (explaining that misappropriation
in H.R. 354 is comparable to sui generis right in Database Directive).
223. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text (arguing that United States
should be granted reciprocal protection under Database Directive).
224. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (describing disadvantage Database
Directive creates for U.S. database producers).
225. See supra notes 44, 134 (noting intent of both Database Directive and H.R. 354
was to promote production of databases).
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Copyright protection for databases in the United States,
while essential, is extremely limited. 226 American database mak-
ers will be less likely to produce new and innovative databases
without reciprocal protection from the EU. 2 27  Thus, U.S.
lawmakers must ensure that a U.S. bill is passed that fulfills the
comparable protection standard and is then approved by the Eu-
ropean Commission.228
When addressing database protection, the United States
must stay within the bounds of the U.S. Constitution. 229 Thus,
U.S. lawmakers must use unfair competition as a basis for pro-
tecting the database maker's interest rather than granting a full
property right to the database maker.230 This will maintain the
constitutionality of the law, while providing the same level of
protection to database makers. 231 Other concerns expressed by
opponents of granting the Untied States reciprocal database
protection relate to the differing rules regarding duration of
protection. 232 Thus, opponents argue that reciprocal protection
should be denied until database laws are harmonized and the
possibility of abuse of the more lenient U.S. duration of protec-
tion clauses is eliminated.233
There are several arguments, however, against such a view.
First, practically speaking, H.R. 354's preservation of contractual
arrangement will have the same effect as the Database Directive's
provisions dealing with duration of protection.234 Second, nam-
226. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (discussing limited protection
afforded to databases in post-Feist era).
227. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing risk of piracy
database makers face that may serve as disincentive to produce more databases).
228. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text (arguing United States must
pass database protection bill in order to compete in international database market).
229. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional issues
U.S. lawmakers face in enacting full property right in databases).
230. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (suggesting protection based on
unfair competition will provide comparable protection without violating U.S. Constitu-
tion).
231. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text (arguing differences between
unfair competition and full property right are trivial).
232. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text (explaining differences in dura-
tion of protection between H.R. 354 and Database Directive).
233. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (providing explanation of why
reciprocal protection should be denied).
234. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text (explaining that even oppo-
nents of providing comparable protection for H.R. 354 recognize that differences in
duration of protection are immaterial).
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ing one right "misappropriation" and one right "sui generis" does
not erase the fact that both provisions provide equal protection
to database makers. 235 Finally, granting the United States recip-
rocal protection under H.R. 354 is consistent with the goals of
both H.R. 354 and the Database Directive.23 6 Most notable is the
desire to promote the creation of databases and prevent signifi-
cant unauthorized extractions of data. 237 Thus, critics of H.R.
354 should be more concerned with protecting investments in
data and expanding the protection against piracy to effectively
promote database creation.
B. Specific Issues and Provisions to Address in a New Bill
In accordance with the ongoing efforts of U.S. lawmakers to
obtain comparable protection for U.S. databases in the EU, a
new database protection bill will likely be introduced in the
107th Congress. H.R. 354 has been introduced twice with slight
variations; accordingly, it is likely that another form of this bill
will be introduced.238 Certain provisions of H.R. 354 should be
flagged for review and revision in order to provide the most
comprehensive database bill possible and to ensure reciprocal
protection will be granted.
First, the new bill should clearly articulate that its purpose is
to provide comparable protection under the EU Database Direc-
tive. While the accompanying House Report to H.R. 354 con-
tains a statement of intent, the bill itself is not clear as to what it
intends to accomplish on an international scale. 239 The lack of a
statement espousing this intent may be a fatal flaw to the grant-
ing of comparable protection to U.S. databases by the EU.240 If
the Commission shares the views of some legal commentators,
there is always a small possibility of denying reciprocal protec-
235. See supra note 148 (discussing similarities between misappropriation and sui
generis database protection).
236. See supra notes 44, 134 (discussing main goals of Database Directive and H.R.
354 as prevention of unlawful copying of databases).
237. See supra notes 37-44, 134 (articulating goals of Database Directive and H.R.
354).
238. See supra notes 17, 132-37 and accompanying text (describing origins of H.R.
354).
239. See supra notes 181-85 (discussing House Report accompanying H.R. 354).
240. See supra notes 195-209 and accompanying text (explaining why H.R. 354
should be denied reciprocal protection under Database Directive).
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tion to the United States. 4' If the Commission takes the ap-
proach that misappropriation and sui generis protection are dif-
ferent, it may nevertheless be more lenient in granting recipro-
cal protection if the United States clearly states the intention of
the bill to provide reciprocal protection under the Database Di-
rective.242
A second issue that a new database protection bill should
address is the ability to contract rights granted in the bill.243
H.R. 354 allows contract to be used to override any excep-
tions,2 14 4 while the Database Directive gives specific examples of
what contractual provisions may be overridden. 245 If compara-
ble protection is granted under these circumstances, it would be
possible for a database producer to contract against scientific
and educational uses under H.R. 354 but have to maintain them
under the Database Directive. 246 Thus, limits should be placed
on what types of rights can and cannot be overridden by contrac-
tual agreement. 247
CONCLUSION
The United States should amend H.R. 354 to include its in-
tention to provide reciprocal protection and to limit what types
of rights can be overridden by contract. Clearly articulated re-
strictions on which rights can and cannot be altered by contract
are necessary to ensure that the United States provides compara-
ble protection to EU Databases. The United States should be
granted reciprocity under the EU Database Directive if an
amended version of H.R. 354 is passed. Misappropriation and
sui generis regimes afford comparable protection to the produc-
ers of databases. If reciprocal protection is granted to the
United States, U.S. investment in database production will in-
crease. Furthermore, with comparable laws in the United States
241. See id.
242. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text (explaining why some com-
mentators feel misappropriation and sui generis regimes provide different levels of
database protection).
243. See supra notes 210-12 (noting differences in how provisions to contract are
handled under H.R. 354 and Database Directive).
244. See supra note 17 (discussing section 1405(a)-(b), (e) of Database Directive).
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and the EU, it is far more likely that an international database
protection treaty will be passed. Protection of databases is an
important governmental goal, and it can be achieved on an in-
ternational level if an amended version of H.R. 354 is adopted.
